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CHARGING THE POOR: CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT & 
MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
NEIL L. SOBOL* 
ABSTRACT 
 Debtors’ prisons should no longer exist.  While imprisonment 
for debt was common in colonial times in the United States, sub-
sequent constitutional provisions, legislation, and court rulings 
all called for the abolition of incarcerating individuals to collect 
debt.  Despite these prohibitions, individuals who are unable to 
pay debts are now regularly incarcerated, and the vast majority 
of them are indigent. In 2015, at least ten lawsuits were filed 
against municipalities for incarcerating individuals in modern-
day debtors’ prisons. 
 Criminal justice debt is the primary source for this imprison-
ment.  Criminal justice debt includes fines, restitution charges, 
court costs, and fees.  Monetary charges exist at all stages of the 
criminal justice system from pre-conviction to parole.  They in-
clude a wide variety of items, such as fees for electronic monitor-
ing, probation, and room and board.  Forty-three states even 
charge fees for an indigent’s “free” public defender.  With ex-
panding incarceration rates and contracting state budgets, mone-
tary sanctions have continued to escalate.  Additionally, many 
states and localities are now outsourcing prison, probation, mon-
itoring, and collection services to private companies, who add 
additional fees and charges to the criminal justice debt burden of 
defendants. 
 The impact of criminal justice debt is especially severe on the 
poor and minorities as they are frequently assessed “poverty 
penalties” for interest, late fees, installment plans, and collection.  
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Often they have to decide between paying criminal justice debt 
and buying family necessities.  The deaths of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Eric Garner in New York, and Freddie Gray in Balti-
more have prompted renewed calls for investigation of the ad-
verse treatment of the poor and minorities in the criminal justice 
system.  The fear of arrest, incarceration, and unfair treatment 
for those owing criminal justice debt creates distrust in the sys-
tem. 
 In February 2015, a class action complaint was filed against 
the City of Ferguson asserting that the city’s jails had become a 
“modern debtors’ prison scheme” that had “devastated the 
City’s poor, trapping them for years in a cycle of increased fees, 
debts, extortion, and cruel jailings.”1  Moreover, the Department 
of Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police Department presents a 
scathing indictment of a system apparently more concerned with 
revenue collection than justice. Unfortunately, as illustrated by 
recent lawsuits and investigations alleging debtors’ prisons in 
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington, 
the abuses are not limited to Ferguson, Missouri. 
 The same concerns that led to the historical restrictions on 
debtors’ prisons have risen again with the growth of modern-day 
debtors’ prisons.  Similar to the prisons in London during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that were criticized for using 
a privatized system that charged inmates for all services, includ-
ing room and board, the current justice system improperly charg-
es the poor.  It is now time to revisit these concerns and imple-
ment effective restrictions to reduce the incidence of debtors’ 
prisons.  To remedy these concerns, my Article proposes eliminat-
ing egregious sanctions, providing courts flexibility to base fines 
on earning levels, and establishing procedures to enforce re-
strictions against incarcerating those who are truly unable to pay 
their criminal justice debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 1.  Class Action Complaint ¶ 6, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 14:15-cv-00253 (E.D. Mo. 
Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-
Ferguson-Debtors-Prison-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [hereinafter Ferguson Complaint]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Case 1: A woman is imprisoned along with her sick baby for fail-
ure to pay a $12 debt and court costs of $4.63.  After more than 
twenty days in jail, the infant is so sick that authorities remove 
the child, and the child dies away from her imprisoned mom. 
 
Case 2: A woman is sentenced to jail based on failure to pay fines 
and fees related to the truancy of her children.  She dies her first 
night in prison. 
 
Both cases are tragic.  Both involve imprisonment for failure to pay 
amounts owed.  Both prompted calls for reforms.  Case 1 is the story of 
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Hannah Crispy, which occurred in Boston in 1820.2  Case 1 and similar 
cases helped trigger calls to end the use of prisons for the collection of 
debt.3  And states responded by passing laws to abolish the practice.4 
Case 2, however, is the story of Eileen DiNino of Berks County, Penn-
sylvania, and it occurred nearly 200 years after Crispy’s case.5  In June 
2014, DiNino, a fifty-five-year-old unemployed mother of seven kids, 
agreed to a jail term of two days because she was unable to pay approxi-
mately $2000 in fines, fees, and court costs assessed against her because her 
children had not attended school.6  Incarcerating parents for failure to pay 
truancy fines is not uncommon in Berks County as over 1600 people have 
been jailed for the offense since 2000.7  More than sixty-six percent of the 
jailed parents are women.8  Typically, truancy fines are relatively small, 
$75 or less; however, court costs and fees compound the amount due.9  
Costs and fees assessed against DiNino included charges for a “judicial 
computer project,” constables, and postage.10  As with Crispy’s tragic case, 
DiNino’s case has also led to a call for alternatives to debtors’ prisons.11 
                                                          
 2.  Karen Gross, Marie Stefanini Newman & Denise Campbell, Ladies in Red: Learning 
from America’s First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 35–36 (1996). 
 3.  Id. at 35 n.190 (describing Colonel Richard M. Johnson’s use of Hannah Crispy’s story in 
an 1832 speech to the U.S. Senate calling for the abolition of debtors’ prisons).  
 4.  See Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 
1402 n.232 (1983) (identifying that by the 1840s several states, including New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, 
and Georgia had prohibited imprisonment for debt).  Interestingly, states passed laws that specifi-
cally banned debtors’ prisons for women before passing similar restrictions for men.  Id. at 1406–
07.  
 5.  Maryclaire Dale, Woman Sentenced to Two Days for Truancy Fines Dies in Jail; Judge 
Says It Was His Only Option, STARTRIBUNE (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.startribune.com/nation/262737551.html. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also ruled that truancy laws may apply to the 
parents of kindergarteners.  Commonwealth v. Kerstetter, 94 A.3d 991, 1005–06 (Pa. 2014). 
 8.  Dale, supra note 5. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See Eric Owens, Mom of Seven Died in This Prison After Judge Jailed Her for Her Kids’ 
Excessive Truancy, DAILY CALLER (June 14, 2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/14/mom-of-
seven-died-in-this-prison-after-judge-jailed-her-for-her-kids-excessive-truancy/; Alan Pyke, Im-
poverished Mother Dies in Jail Cell over Unpaid Fines for Her Kids Missing School, 
THINKPROGRESS (June 12, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/06/12/3448105/mother-
dies-jail-cell-fines/.  Bills calling for the establishment of “Eileen’s Law” have been introduced in 
Pennsylvania’s House and Senate, and on February 25, 2015, the House unanimously approved its 
proposal for Eileen’s Law.  Dan Kelly, State House Approves ‘Eileen’s Law’, READING EAGLE 
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://readingeagle.com/news/article/state-house-approves-eileens-
law&template=mobileart.  Supporters hope that the bill will be presented to the governor before 
January 2016.  Dan Kelly, Key Senator Says Eileen’s Law Should Go to Gov. Tom Wolf by Year’s 
End, READING EAGLE (June 10, 2015), http://readingeagle.com/news/article/key-senator-says-
eileens-law-should-go-to-gov-tom-wolf-by-years-end.  
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The issue of incarcerating indigents for failure to pay fines and fees is 
not limited to Berks County, Pennsylvania, but is a national phenomenon 
that has apparently accompanied the growth of mass incarceration in the 
United States.12  America leads the world in incarceration rates.13  Nearly 
one-quarter of the prisoners in the world are in the United States, even 
though more than ninety-five percent of the world’s population is outside 
the United States.14  Significant racial disparities exist in the prison popula-
tion, with black males imprisoned at more than six times the rate of white 
males.15  Moreover, racial disparity in prisons is expected to continue, with 
                                                          
 12.  Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as 
Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 524 (2011) (finding “nonpayment of 
monetary sanctions leads to a significant number of warrants, arrests, probation revocations, jail 
stays, and prison admissions in locales across the country”); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 50 (2010), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf (former county public defender in Ohio 
estimating that “20 to 25 percent of all local incarcerations statewide are for fines and costs, while 
about 50 percent of arrests are for fines and costs”).  For a story discussing the growth in lawsuits 
alleging that municipalities are operating debtors’ prisons, see Joseph Shapiro, Lawsuits Target 
‘Debtors’ Prisons’ Across the Country, NPR (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/21/450546542/lawsuits-target-debtors-prisons-across-the-country 
(identifying lawsuits filed in September and October 2015 in New Orleans, La.; Rutherford Coun-
ty, Tenn.; Biloxi and Jackson, Miss.; Benton County, Wash.; and Alexander City, Ala.).  Addi-
tionally, on October 27, 2015, a federal lawsuit was filed against Austin, Texas alleging that the 
city regularly jails indigent defendants for failure to pay legal financial obligations for misde-
meanors, fails to provide them with counsel, and fails to conduct ability-to-pay hearings.  Class 
Action Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, Gonzales v. City of Austin, No. 15-cv-956 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2488534/complaint-against-austin.pdf. 
 13.  Marie Gottschalk, The Past, Present, and Future of Mass Incarceration in the United 
States, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 483 (2011) (describing the United States as “the 
world’s warden, incarcerating a larger proportion of its people than any other country”).  
 14.  INIMAI CHETTIAR, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & NICOLE FORTIER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, REFORMING FUNDING TO REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 3 (2013) (citing ROY 
WALMSLEY, INT’L. CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 (9th ed. 
2011)), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/REFORM_FUND_MASS_INCARC
_web_0.pdf.  The general issue of mass incarceration is beyond the scope of this Article.  For 
more detailed information, see Gottschalk, supra note 13; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
2 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014), 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-
causes.  
 15.  CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 14, at 9 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., KING’S DREAM 
REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL; MANY AMERICANS SEE RACIAL DISPARITIES 20 (2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/22/kings-dream-remains-an-elusive-goal-many-
americans-see-racial-disparities/4/#incarceration-rate); Mae C. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due: 
Theorizing a Modern Fourteenth Amendment Framework for Juvenile Defense Representation, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 2185, 2204 (2014) (referring to sources that document how “contemporary criminal 
courts maintain a de facto caste system that has historically disenfranchised and dehumanized per-
sons of color”).  The general issue of disparate treatment of prisoners in the United States is be-
yond the scope of this Article.  For more information, see JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE 
SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE (2015), 
 2016] CHARGING THE POOR 491 
one-third of black males and one-sixth of Hispanic males born recently pre-
dicted to be incarcerated at some point in their lives.16  In the last ten years, 
the term “mass incarceration” has been used to describe the prison problem 
in the United States.17 
While people are generally aware of the issue of mass incarceration,18 
most also assume that debtors’ prisons no longer exist.19  They believe that 
debtors’ prisons are a relic of a past described by Charles Dickens.20  Fed-
eral and state laws both restrict imprisonment for debt.21  Despite these pro-
hibitions, incarceration for failure to pay continues.  While prisons housing 
only debtors no longer exist, individuals are still being incarcerated when 
they are unable to pay their debts.22  The sources for incarceration based on 
failure to pay vary and include administrative detention, civil contempt, 
child support orders, and monetary obligations that the criminal justice sys-
tem imposes.23 
This Article focuses on criminal justice debt.  Criminal justice debt in-
cludes a broad range of items, also referred to as legal financial obligations 
(“LFOs”).24  The main categories of LFOs are fines, restitution charges, and 
fees.25  With increasing incarceration rates and growing budgetary con-
cerns, LFOs have escalated dramatically over the last forty years.26  Mone-
                                                          
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Report%
20062515.pdf; CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY, CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE US CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/created-
equal.pdf. 
 16.  Gottschalk, supra note 13, at 483. 
 17.  Oliver Roeder, Just Facts: Quantifying the Incarceration Conversation, BRENNAN CTR. 
BLOG (July 16, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/just-facts-quantifying-incarceration-
conversation (describing the development of the term “mass incarceration”). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 526. 
 20.  Stephen J. Ware, A 20th Century Debate About Imprisonment for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 351, 352–53 (2014); see e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 41–42, 57, 383 (Barnes & 
Noble, Inc. 2009) (1857) (describing the Marshalsea debtors’ prison). 
 21.  See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 526. 
 23.  Katherine Beckett & Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: Toward an 
Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 221, 234 
(2012), http://tcr.sagepub.com/content/16/2/221.  
 24.  Id. at 227; Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1176−77. 
 25.  See infra Part II.A.  
 26.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 512−13; Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine 
Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary 
United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1756 (2010) (finding that “monetary sanctions are now im-
posed by the courts on a substantial majority of the millions of U.S. residents convicted of felony 
and misdemeanor crimes each year”); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Pun-
ishment Regime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 556–57 (2011) (observing that “the growth 
of fines, fees, and other debts accompanied the trend line in the increase of incarceration since the 
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tary charges now exist at all stages of the criminal justice process, including 
pre-conviction, sentencing, incarceration, probation, and parole.27  Fees 
have expanded to include a wide variety of charges purportedly to reim-
burse the costs of state and local entities.28  The fees even cover constitu-
tionally required services such as public defenders.29  The system of using 
fees has been labeled an “offender-funded” system.30  Offender funding has 
grown over the years, and several states now outsource prison, probation, 
monitoring, and collection services to private companies.31  These compa-
nies may assess and collect fees, using the threat of incarceration for failure 
to pay.32 
The growth in incarceration of individuals for failure to pay LFOs has 
accompanied the increase in criminal justice debt.33  Indigents are jailed or 
imprisoned despite statutory and case law prohibitions against incarceration 
based on their inability to pay their debts.34 
As may be expected, the impact on the poor and minorities is especial-
ly severe.35  A two-tiered system exists where those who can pay their 
criminal justice debts can escape the system while those who are unable to 
pay are trapped and face additional charges for late fees, installment plans, 
and interest.36  These extra charges have been referred to as “poverty penal-
                                                          
early 1970s”); Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.  For 
example, the percentage of inmates with LFOs grew from twenty-five percent in 1991 to sixty-six 
percent in 2004.  Gerry Myers, Never Mind What the Constitution Says, Our Prison System Has 
Run Amok, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gerry-
myers/never-mind-what-the-const_b_5523165.html?view=screen.  For more details, see infra Part 
III.A. 
 27.  Shapiro, supra note 26.  For more details, see infra Part II.A. 
 28.  Shapiro, supra note 26.  For more details, see infra Part II.A.3. 
 29.  Shapiro, supra note 26. 
 30.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-
FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1 (2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf. 
 31.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30 (describing offender-funded probation systems); 
Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1193. 
 32.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 49.  Typically, civil debt collectors may not 
threaten arrest or imprisonment.  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4) (2012). 
 33.  Shapiro, supra note 26; see infra Part III.B. 
 34.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671–73 (1983) (holding that the court should assess a 
convict’s ability to pay before revoking probation for failure to pay fines or restitution); Shapiro, 
supra note 26; see infra Part III.B. 
 35.  Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 1756 (finding “that penal institutions are in-
creasingly imposing a particularly burdensome and consequential form of debt on a significant 
and growing share of the poor”); see infra Part III.C. 
 36.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 10; Shapiro, supra note 26 (describing the 
practice of charging fees as one “that causes the poor to face harsher treatment than others who 
commit identical crimes and can afford to pay”). 
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ties.”37  Ironically, those least able to pay wind up with more LFOs than 
those who can pay their fines and fees upfront.38  Additionally, the use and 
threat of incarceration may be financially counterproductive, as the ex-
penditures for arrest and incarceration may be more than the amounts as-
sessed or ever collected from those unable to pay.39 
Even in situations where physical incarceration may not occur, the 
poor and minorities often have LFOs that they are unable to pay and fear 
that failure to pay may result in arrest and imprisonment.40  The monetary 
obligations and stigma from failure to pay reduce the likelihood of obtain-
ing employment and force individuals to choose between necessities, in-
cluding family support, and payment of their LFOs.41  The threat of incar-
ceration for unpaid LFOs may even encourage individuals to commit 
crimes to obtain funds to avoid incarceration.42 
This Article examines the relationship between criminal justice debt 
and the use of incarceration for failure to pay.  Part I provides a brief history 
of debtors’ prisons explaining how they began and the call for their aboli-
tion.  Part II defines the sources of criminal justice debt and identifies the 
general prohibitions designed to prevent the use of debtors’ prisons to re-
cover criminal justice debt.  Part III recognizes that, despite these prohibi-
tions, courts are incarcerating indigent defendants for failure to pay criminal 
justice debt.  This Part describes the growth in criminal justice debt as well 
as the resurgence of debtors’ prisons.  It explains how the process has creat-
ed a two-tiered system that adversely affects the poor and minorities, often 
placing them in a never-ending cycle of poverty, and creating distrust in the 
system.  Furthermore, this Part identifies the conflicts of interest that exist 
in the current system of assessing and collecting criminal justice debt. 
                                                          
 37.  ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf.  
 38.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 10. 
 39.  Id. at 9 (“incarcerating indigent defendants unable to pay their LFOs often ends up cost-
ing much more than states and counties can ever hope to recover”); LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CHARGING INMATES PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 4–5 
(2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/blog/Charging_Inmates_Mass_Incarceration.pdf. 
 40.  Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 1761–62. 
 41.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 517–23; see also FOSTER COOK, JEFFERSON 
COUNTY’S COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAM TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SAFER 
COMMUNITIES, THE BURDEN OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IN ALABAMA: 2014 PARTICIPANT 
SELF-REPORT SURVEY 24 (2014), 
http://media.al.com/opinion/other/The%20Burden%20of%20Criminal%20Justice%20Debt%20in
%20Alabama-%20Full%20Report.pdf (reporting results from survey of Alabama residents with 
criminal justice debt and showing that survey participants forwent necessities such as utilities, 
groceries, and rent or mortgage payments in order to pay for criminal justice debt). 
 42.  Katzenstein & Nagrecha, supra note 26, at 566. 
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Part IV proposes a framework for reducing the incidence of debtors’ 
prisons.  This Part examines various proposals and concludes that states 
should follow a hybrid approach to provide specific guidance to help ensure 
that the constitutional rights of indigents are not violated.  As part of this 
approach, remedies should be based on the nature of the monetary sanction.  
If the charge is merely to reimburse the state, the remedies should be lim-
ited to civil remedies, and not include arrest or incarceration.  For other 
monetary sanctions, incarceration should only be permitted if a court, after 
notice and hearing, specifically determines that the inability to pay is not 
the basis for failure to pay.  Defendants should be afforded the right to 
counsel at this hearing.  The determination of ability to pay should depend 
on whether the monetary sanction would impose undue hardship on the de-
fendant and her dependents.  To help with enforcement and understanding 
of the proposal, this Part also recommends measures that allow for the 
adjustment of sanctions based on earnings and provide notice, education, 
transparency, and accountability for all actors (including third-party 
companies) involved in the assessment and collection of criminal justice 
debt. 
The call to end debtors’ prisons began centuries ago, and while laws 
have been passed to eliminate them, in practice, debtors’ prisons are now 
flourishing.  Many of the same concerns that initially prompted public out-
cry against debtors’ prisons exist today.  It is time to eliminate modern-day 
debtors’ prisons and recognize that alternatives to incarceration should be 
used for those truly unable to pay debts. 
I.  A SHORT HISTORY OF DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
A general understanding of the historical development of debtors’ 
prisons is helpful in evaluating the issues with modern-day debtors’ prisons 
because many of the concerns that led to the abolition of these prisons have 
resurfaced with the recent expansion of the use and threat of incarceration 
for those who are unable to pay monetary obligations.  Accordingly, this 
Part will briefly discuss the rise and fall of debtors’ prisons prior to their 
contemporary resurgence. 
A.  The Rise and Fall of Debtors’ Prisons in Europe 
Throughout history, imprisonment for debt has ebbed and flowed.43  
Most civilizations have incarcerated debtors for failure to pay their debts.44  
                                                          
 43.  See Matthew J. Baker, Metin Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, Debtors’ Prisons in America: 
An Economic Analysis, 84 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 216, 217 (2012) (providing an overview of 
debtors’ prisons from the Middle Ages in Europe to the Reconstruction Era in America).  A de-
tailed discussion of the history of imprisonment for debt is beyond the scope of this Article.  For 
more detailed information, see Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24 (1927). 
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The Bible reflects the common use of the practice.45  In 451 B.C., the Ro-
mans, in their first written law, the Twelve Tables, formalized incarceration 
for those unable to pay their debts.46  Imprisonment for debt in Rome con-
tinued for over 100 years until 326 B.C.  In that year, prompted by public 
calls after a creditor beat the son of a debtor, the Roman Senate prohibited 
incarceration based on failure to pay debts and ordered the release of all 
confined debtors.47 
Unfortunately, the Roman proclamation did not end the use of debtors’ 
prisons.  Instead, the use continued during the Middle Ages, although their 
use fluctuated.48  Similarly, despite reports that imprisonment for debt in 
England ended with the Norman Conquest in 1066, incarceration for debts 
gained new life with the passage of imprisonment statutes in 1267 and 
1285.49  Under these statutes and subsequent enactments, debtors’ prisons 
would continue in England for more than five centuries.50 
Relying on manuscripts and petitions from prisoners, Dr. Philip Wood-
fine of the University of Huddersfield has written about the conditions of 
debtors’ prisons in Yorkshire County, England during the eighteenth centu-
ry.51  The prisons were run as “semiprivatized” systems operating for profit, 
in which jailers would assess prisoner fees, “including fees for admission 
and release,” as well as charges “for rooms, bed linen, beer, and food.”52  
Reports issued in 1729–1730 reflected concerns about “the evil of exorbi-
tant fees” that “arose chiefly from the franchising of prisons, which meant 
that a marshal or keeper had to return a substantial profit on the jail each 
year.”53 
The privatized system, which was typically unregulated by the courts 
and the legislature, created a conflict of interest for wardens who were de-
                                                          
 44.  Baker et al., supra note 43 at 217; Richard E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back into the 
Law and Debtors Back into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 
143, 145–49 (2002); Becky A. Vogt, Note, State v. Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South Da-
kota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 338–40 (2001). 
 45.  See Baker et al., supra note 43, at 217 (citing Matthew 18:29–31); James, supra note 44, 
at 146; Vogt, supra note 44, at 339. 
 46.  Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Examination of Debtor Incarceration in the Modern Age, 
37 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 358 (2006); Vogt, supra note 44, at 338–39. 
 47.  Vogt, supra note 44, at 339. 
 48.  Baker et al., supra note 43, at 217; Ford, supra note 43, at 25–26. 
 49.  Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 154 (1982) (describing the coverage of the im-
prisonment statutes of 1267 and 1285); Ford, supra note 43, at 27; James, supra note 44, at 146; 
Vogt, supra note 44, at 340–42. 
 50.  Baker et al., supra note 43, at 217. 
 51.  Philip Woodfine, Debtors, Prisons, and Petitions in Eighteenth-Century England, 30 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE, Spring 2006, at 1. 
 52.  Id. at 5–6. 
 53.  Id. at 12–13. 
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pendent on fees from their inmates.54  As a result, even if fees were thought 
to be unconscionable, they were not challenged because of “the need to en-
sure that prison officials would have access to a dependable income.”55 
Despite these concerns, imprisonment for debt continued in England 
and virtually all of Europe during the 1800s.56  Meaningful reform did not 
occur until 1869 when Parliament enacted acts abolishing imprisonment for 
debt, releasing incarcerated debtors, and establishing a process for dis-
charge through bankruptcy.57  Even with the passage of these statutes, re-
ports of instances of incarceration for debt in England continued into the 
twentieth century.58 
B.  The Rise and Fall of Debtors’ Prisons in America 
Although initially colonists were sympathetic to debtors, by the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century, imprisonment of debtors was a common 
practice in America.59  As in England, some states had separate buildings 
for the housing of debtors.60  The list of imprisoned debtors included 
society’s poorest individuals as well as some of its wealthiest and famous 
members, such as “Robert Morris, who helped finance the American 
Revolution and ran the Treasury under the Articles of Confederation.”61 
Class segregation existed among imprisoned debtors.62  As in England, 
inmates in America’s eighteenth-century debtors’ prisons could pay for bet-
ter services and conditions, assuming they had money or could borrow 
                                                          
 54.  Id. at 6; see Alex Pitofsky, The Warden’s Court Martial: James Oglethorpe and the Poli-
tics of Eighteenth-Century Prison Reform, 24 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE, Winter 2000, at 88, 
98–99 (concluding that “[t]he fact that wardens’ offices constituted legally protected private prop-
erty also militated against most attempts to reform the nation’s penal institutions”).  
 55.  Pitofsky, supra note 54, at 99. 
 56.  See Baker et al., supra note 43, at 217; Ford, supra note 43, at 30 (referencing an 1834 
British parliamentary commission report “that at the time imprisonment for debt was legal in eve-
ry country in continental Europe except Portugal”). 
 57.  Cohen, supra note 49, at 164. 
 58.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 19 (citing Sandor E. Schick, Globalization, Bankrupt-
cy, and the Myth of the Broken Bench, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 219, 258 & n.202 (2006)); Ware, su-
pra note 20, at 376. 
 59.  Baker et al., supra note 43, at 217; James, supra note 44, at 147; Vogt, supra note 44, at 
343. 
 60.  Steve Fraser, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt, 33 RARITAN 67, 69 (2013).  For 
example, the Debtors’ Prison in Worsham, Virginia, was built in 1787 and remains on the national 
register of historic places.  VA. DEP’T OF HISTORIC RES., NATIONAL REGISTRY OF HISTORIC 
PLACES NOMINATION FORM: DEBTORS’ PRISON (1972), 
http://www.dhr.virginia.gov/registers/Counties/PrinceEdward/073-
0007_Debtor’s_Prison_1972_Final_Nomination.pdf. 
 61.  Fraser, supra note 60, at 68–69 (listing famous individuals imprisoned for debt, including 
army generals, an officer in the Treasury Department, and a state Supreme Court judge). 
 62.  Id. at 69. 
 2016] CHARGING THE POOR 497 
funds.63  Debtors with large debts and good social connections enjoyed 
“good food and well-appointed living quarters, as well as books and other 
amusements, including on occasion manicurists and prostitutes.”64  On the 
other hand, debtors with petty debts, who comprised the vast majority of 
debtors in prison, lived in unclean and disease-ridden places and were 
charged for necessities such as food, water, and heat, which, of course, they 
could not afford.65 
A financial crisis in 1797 causing the incarceration of thousands, in-
cluding Robert Morris, led to the passage of America’s first federal bank-
ruptcy law in 1800.66  The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, however, was short-
lived as it was repealed after only three years.67  Moreover, the Act provid-
ed relief only to debtors who were merchants.68  It did not apply to the 
thousands in prison based on petty debts.69 
In 1821, Kentucky, led by the efforts of Senator Richard Johnson, be-
came the first state to abolish debtors’ prisons.70  Senator Johnson also in-
troduced similar legislation in 1822 at the federal level, and in an appendix 
to his address to the United States Congress, he included the story of Han-
nah Crispy’s experience in a Boston debtors’ prison.71  Federal law restrict-
                                                          
 63.  NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 296–98 (2013).  Interestingly, in his text, Professor Par-
rillo describes the transition of public official compensation between 1780 and 1940 from a profit-
based system relying on payments received for services or results to a salary system that removed 
the profit motive.  Id. at 1–4. 
 64.  Fraser, supra note 60, at 69.  A comparison can be made to the “pay-to-upgrade” systems 
that currently exist in certain California counties that allow those with sufficient resources to pay 
for improved accommodations while incarcerated.  See EISEN, supra note 39, at 3; Leah A. Plun-
kett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 61 (2013). 
 65.  Fraser, supra note 60, at 70. 
 66.  Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995). 
 67.  Id. at 14–15.  Robert Morris, however, did receive a discharge.  Id. at 15.  
 68.  Id. at 14.  
 69.  See Fraser, supra note 60, at 72.  Fraser compares the situation of only providing relief to 
those with sizable debt to the “too big to fail” institutions of modern times because big debtors 
were necessary to the operation of credit-based commerce.  Id. (stating “[i]t made no sense for 
those interested in nurturing the growth of a commercial civilization to stop up the arteries of 
commerce, which after all couldn’t function without instruments of credit and debt, by taking its 
most successful debtors out of circulation”). 
 70.  Scott Jennings, Kentucky’s Tradition of Reforming Nation’s Prisons, COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/08/05/kentuckys-
tradition-reforming-nations-prisons/13618337.  The 1776 and 1790 constitutions of Pennsylvania 
did “nominally” abolish imprisonment for debt; however, Pennsylvania continued to imprison 
debtors with an estimated 7000 imprisoned in 1830.  Ford, supra note 43, at 29 & n.28. 
 71.  Gross, supra note 2, at 35 n.190 (citing Col. Richard M. Johnson, On a Proposition to 
Abolish Imprisonment for Debt, (Jan. 14, 1823) app. at 22, 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100187404 (submitted to the U.S. Senate)); Jennings, supra 
note 70. 
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ing incarceration for failure to pay debts was enacted in 1933.72  Similarly, 
in the 1830s, significant calls for reform had also begun at the state level 
with state constitutional and legislative pronouncements declaring an end to 
imprisonment for debt.73 
Currently, statutory or constitutional provisions prohibiting imprison-
ment for debt exist in every state.74  Additionally, federal imprisonment for 
debt is not permitted in states that prohibit incarceration for debt.75 
II.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT AND RESTRICTIONS ON DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
Despite the prohibitions in the United States, individuals are currently 
being imprisoned for failure to pay debts.  The “pathways” to prison or jail 
vary and involve both criminal and civil law.76  Incarceration may occur in 
child support cases,77 administrative detention matters,78 and post-judgment 
civil collection matters.79  Additionally, failure to pay criminal justice debt 
represents a significant and growing reason for incarceration in today’s 
debtors’ prisons.80  This section describes the origins and development of 
criminal justice debt as well as the restrictions on the use of incarceration as 
a method of collecting the debt. 
A.  Defining Criminal Justice Debt 
Criminal justice debt is a catchall phrase for the financial charges as-
sessed in the criminal justice process.  These charges are also referred to as 
                                                          
 72.  Jennings, supra note 70. 
 73.  Ford, supra note 43, at 29; Tabb, supra note 66, at 16.  
 74.  Vogt, supra note 44, at 348.  Vogt has also compiled a listing of the relevant statutory 
and constitutional provisions.  Id. at 335 n.9. 
 75.  28 U.S.C. § 2007 (2012); Vogt, supra note 44, at 348. 
 76.  Beckett & Murakawa, supra note 23, at 227. 
 77.  The discussion of incarceration for failure to pay child support is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  For more detailed information, see Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indi-
gent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 95, 95 (2008) (explaining that “[e]ach day in the United States thousands of persons are 
jailed on charges arising from failure to pay court-ordered child support”). 
 78.  Beckett & Murakawa, supra note 23, at 225–27. 
 79.  In these matters, typically incarceration is the result of a contempt order based on an al-
leged debtor’s failure to respond to or attend a hearing on post-judgment discovery in a collection 
matter.  See Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1509 (discussing the use of 
in personam debt collection remedies).  National Public Radio has also reported on the problem of 
incarcerating individuals for failure to pay civil debts.  Susie An, Unpaid Bills Land Some Debtors 
Behind Bars, NPR (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/12/143274773/unpaid-bills-land-
some-debtors-behind-bars; see Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debtor Arrests Criticized, WALL ST. J. 
(NOV. 22, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203710704577052373900992432 (noting 
that more than thirty-three percent of states allow incarceration for failure to pay civil debts).  
 80.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 8. 
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legal financial obligations or LFOs.81  Fines, restitution charges, and fees 
are the primary components of LFOs.82  An understanding of the origin and 
purported rationale for these categories is helpful in assessing the use of in-
carceration as a method of collecting criminal justice debt. 
1.  Fines 
Fines are a widely used method of punishing defendants.83  If a de-
fendant is unable or unwilling to pay a fine, the defendant will likely face 
incarceration.84  Originally, the basis for fines in England was revenue col-
lection.85  Payment or “mak[ing] fine” to the king was a way that a defend-
ant could settle with the king and avoid incarceration.86  Over time, the pri-
mary rationale for fines became punishment rather than revenue 
generation.87 
In the United States, the recent growth in state and local budgetary is-
sues, however, has prompted a return to the use of fines for revenue genera-
tion.88  Concerns now exist regarding the aggressive use of fines for traffic 
and parking violations to raise money to support local governments.89  The 
Department of Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police Department describes 
a system where “[c]ity, police, and court officials for years have worked in 
concert to maximize revenue at every stage of the enforcement process, be-
ginning with how fines and fine enforcement processes are established.”90 
                                                          
 81.  Beckett & Murakawa, supra note 23, at 227; Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 
1756; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1177. 
 82.  Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ Accumulation of 
Debt As a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POV. L. & POL’Y 187, 188 (2007) 
(characterizing the basic categories of “criminal justice-related debts” as “(1) fines and assess-
ments levied with a punitive purpose; (2) penalties levied with a restitution purpose; and (3) as-
sessments levied with a public cost-recovery purpose”); R. Barry Ruback, The Abolition of Fines 
and Fees: Not Proven and Not Compelling, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 569, 569–70 (2011).  
This list is not exclusive.  See, e.g., R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions 
in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 242, 257–58 
(2006) (characterizing forfeitures as government seizures of property). 
 83.  Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 188; Ruback, supra note 82, at 570.  
 84.  See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970) (stating that “[t]he custom of impris-
oning a convicted defendant for nonpayment of fines dates back to medieval England and has long 
been practiced in this country”).  
 85.  Derek A. Westen, Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: “Thirty Dollars or 
Thirty Days,” 57 CAL. L. REV. 778, 783–84 (1969). 
 86.  Id. at 784. 
 87.  Id. at 785; Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 82, at 249.  Interestingly, as the punitive ra-
tionale for fines supplanted the settlement rationale, the language regarding fines switched from 
“mak[ing] fine[s]” to “be[ing] fined.”  Westen, supra note 85, at 785–86.  
 88.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1194.  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 10 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-
15.pdf. 
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While fines are often the sole punishment for traffic offenses and some 
other misdemeanors, for other offenses, fines supplement incarceration and 
probation.91  American courts of general jurisdiction impose fines in forty-
two percent of cases, while courts of limited jurisdiction assess fines in 
eighty-six percent of cases.92  Fines are assessed in thirty-eight percent of 
all felony convictions in state courts.93  Judges typically impose fines at the 
sentencing stage of a criminal case, without consideration of a defendant’s 
earnings.94 
2.  Restitution 
Similarly, judges may also impose restitution charges at a defendant’s 
sentencing.95  Traditionally, governmental entities have been the recipients 
of fines while victims have been the primary beneficiaries of restitution.96  
Initially, the purported rationale for restitution was to financially restore a 
victim based on the economic damages a defendant’s actions had caused.97  
The rationale for modern-day restitution now includes retribution and pun-
ishment.98  All states permit restitution, and a Department of Justice study 
found that state courts imposed restitution in eighteen percent of felony cas-
                                                          
 91.  Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 127 
(1996). 
 92.  Ruback, supra note 82, at 570. 
 93.  SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. 
 94.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 514–15; cf. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128 
(discussing the “day fine” system in Scandinavian countries, which takes the seriousness of the 
crime and the defendant’s income into account when imposing a fine).  For a discussion of the 
“day-fine” system that bases fines on income level, see infra Part IV.A.2.  
 95.  Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 101 (2014).  A 
detailed discussion of the historical development of restitution payments is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  For a more detailed discussion, see Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey 
of Its Past History and an Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71 (1970); Peggy 
M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21 
(1999).  For a collection of discussions regarding restitution, reconciliation, and restorative justice, 
see CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 
1990). 
 96.  See R. Barry Ruback & Valerie Clark, Economic Sanctions in Pennsylvania: Complex 
and Inconsistent, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 751, 756 (2011) (explaining the purpose of restitution). 
 97.  Lollar, supra note 95, at 99–100; Ruback & Clark, supra note 96, at 756; see also 
Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 82, at 250 (characterizing the purpose of restitution as “doing 
justice by having the offender compensate a victim for damages caused by the crime”). 
 98.  Lollar, supra note 95, at 97–98 (stating that “criminal restitution has evolved from a pri-
marily restorative mechanism to a primarily punitive one” and criticizing courts for not “affording 
restitution the constitutional checks courts normally provide for punishment”); Ruback & Berg-
strom, supra note 82, at 249 (stating that restitution also has a punishment aspect as it “embod-
ies . . . the just deserts notion of offense-based penalties”). 
 2016] CHARGING THE POOR 501 
es.99  Under federal law, restitution is mandatory for specific crimes if there 
is an “identifiable victim.”100  A defendant’s failure to make restitution 
payments can result in revocation of probation and incarceration.101 
3.  Fees102 
Fees differ from restitution and fines in many ways, including, when 
they are assessed, who sets them, what they include, and why they are im-
posed.  While fees imposed on those imprisoned for failure to pay civil 
debts date back to colonial times,103 the imposition of fees on inmates 
charged with crimes in the United States did not begin until 1846, when 
Michigan authorized counties to collect the costs of medical care from 
prisoners.104  Currently, fees on defendants can be imposed at any stage of 
the criminal justice process, including pre-conviction, sentencing, incarcera-
tion, or supervision.105  Moreover, while a judge typically determines fines 
and restitution, other actors may be involved in setting fees, including 
                                                          
 99.  ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 93, at 8; Ruback & Clark, supra note 96, at 756.  
 100.  18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012) (mandating restitution in cases involving crimes of violence, 
offenses against property, “tampering with consumer products,” “theft of medical products,” and 
an “identifiable victim”); Lollar, supra note 95, at 103 (citing the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)). 
 101.  Lollar, supra note 95, at 124.  Under Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983), in-
carceration for failure to pay must be based on willful failure to pay; however, in practice, this 
requirement has not been effectively applied.  Lollar, supra note 95, at 124.  
 102.  Commentators tend to treat costs and fees together; however, Ruback and Bergstrom 
have suggested that a cost refers to “a blanket charge for program admission/participation,” while 
a fee refers to “a specific, individual charge for a service.”  Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 82, 
at 253.  For purposes of this Article, the terms fees and costs are used interchangeably. 
 103.  See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
 104.  Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars 
May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 319 (2014) (citing DALE 
PARENT, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECOVERING CORRECTIONAL COSTS 
THROUGH OFFENDER FEES 1 (1990), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/125084NCJRS.pdf). 
 105.  Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 189; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1185–
86; Plunkett, supra note 64, at 59 (listing of costs may include charges for room and board, “pros-
ecution, judicial proceedings, criminal defense, bail, booking, parole or probation supervision, 
electronic monitoring, substance abuse treatment, [and] medical care” (footnotes omitted) (first 
citing BANNON ET.AL., supra note 37, at 8; then citing MULLANEY, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 7 (1988); then citing 
Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their Court-
Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 
(2009); then citing Kate Levine, Note, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the Constitu-
tionality of Massachusetts's Reimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 191 (2007); then 
citing MULLANEY, supra, at 7; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 30; then citing 
MULLANEY, supra, at 8; then citing NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEES PAID BY 
JAIL INMATES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATION'S LARGEST JAILS 2 (I997); and then citing BARBARA 
KRAUTH & KARIN STAYTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., FEES PAID BY JAIL 
INMATES: FEE CATEGORIES, REVENUES, AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES IN A SAMPLE OF U.S. 
JAILS 15 (Connie Clem ed., 2005))). 
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prosecutors, police, prison officials, and other criminal justice agencies106 
as well as private companies that are the beneficiaries of outsourcing.107 
Pre-conviction assessments may include fees for arrest, issuance of 
warrant, booking, fingerprinting, lab testing, pretrial detention, jury, 
application for a public defender, bail, deferred prosecution agreement, pre-
trial abatement, and rental of monitoring devices.108  Application fees for 
public defenders exist in the majority of states.109  The application fees vary 
by state and may vary based on the offense at issue.110  The typical range is 
$25 to $100.111  Some jurisdictions impose pretrial supervision or condi-
tional bond fees.112  The assessment of pre-judgment fees is not dependent 
upon conviction of the defendant.113 
At sentencing, charges may include fees for pre-sentence and investi-
gatory reports, court administration, designated funds, and reimbursement 
for the public defender and the prosecutor.114   Designated funds may 
finance crime stopper programs, retirement for police officers, courtroom 
technology, and a myriad of services unrelated to the underlying criminal 
charges.115  For example, fees in Allegan County, Michigan help fund the 
county employees’ fitness facility.116 
Charges incurred and assessed during incarceration include fees for 
room and board, health care, haircuts, telephone, and work-release pro-
grams.117  At least forty-three states allow charges for room and board and 
                                                          
 106.  Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 189; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1185–
96.  
 107.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1193. 
 108.  RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: 
THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15–16 (2015), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf; 
Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 189; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1186–89; 
Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 82, at 254; Shapiro, supra note 26. 
 109.  Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for 
Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2052 (2006). 
 110.  Id. at 2052–53.   
 111.  Id. at 2046.  Some states allow waiver of these fees “in cases of extreme poverty.”  Logan 
& Wright, supra note 24, at 1189. 
 112.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 32. 
 113.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1186 (noting that “[t]he presumption of innocence 
does not slow the onset of LFOs”); Bridget McCormack, Economic Incarceration, 25 WINDSOR 
Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 223, 230 (2007) (noting that fees imposed “as conditions of . . . bond while 
the case is pending . . . are not refunded to defendants who are acquitted of their underlying 
charge”); Wright & Logan, supra note 109, at 2054.  
 114.  Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 189; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1190–
91; Shapiro, supra note 26. 
 115.  Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 189; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1190–
91. 
 116.  Shapiro, supra note 26. 
 117.  SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 15; Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 
189; Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1192–93; Shapiro, supra note 26. 
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thirty-five states permit charges for medical care.118  Telephone charges 
have been a “significant moneymaker” with “rates far above the prevailing 
market—generat[ing] millions of dollars annually.”119 
Charges assessed after release may include fees for probation and pa-
role supervision, drug testing, vehicle interlock devices, electronic monitor-
ing, mandatory treatment, required classes, and expungement.120  Forty-four 
states charge defendants for probation and parole services.121  Probation is a 
common alternative to incarceration for misdemeanor offenses.122  All of 
the states, except for Hawaii, assess defendants for monitoring devices.123  
These devices may track location or alcohol intake of defendants.  The so-
phistication of the technology used and associated costs of these devices 
range considerably.  Monthly charges may range from “$180 to $360.”124  
Additionally, defendants are typically charged a “start-up” fee of up to 
$80.125  Similarly, defendants may be assessed mandatory drug testing fees 
of $1250 per year.126 
Court costs and fees help reimburse the burgeoning expenses incurred 
by courts, jails, prisons, and those appointed to supervise, monitor, and 
even represent defendants.127  Their purpose is generally recognized as re-
imbursement as opposed to punishment, victim compensation, rehabilita-
tion, or deterrence.128  “Offender-funding” has been used to identify the 
process of making defendants pay for these expenses.129   
                                                          
 118.  EISEN, supra note 39, at 4. 
 119.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1192–95; see also EISEN, supra note 39, at 2 (noting 
that an inmate’s “short telephone call home can cost as much as $20”); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., 
supra note 108, at 15.  In October 2015, the Federal Communications Commission issued an order 
to cap rates on inmate calls beginning in 2016. See Press Release, Fed. Comm. Commission (Oct. 
22, 2015), FCC Takes Next Big Steps in Reducing Inmate Calling Rates, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db1022/DOC-335984A1.pdf.  
 120.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 37; Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 
189; Shapiro, supra note 26. 
 121.  Shapiro, supra note 26; State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees. 
 122.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 12. 
 123.  Shapiro, supra note 26; State-by-State Court Fees, supra note 121.  
 124.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 33. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 36. 
 127.  Beckett & Murakawa, supra note 23, at 227; Ruback, supra note 82, at 570. 
 128.  See BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4.  Some commentators have argued that fees may 
also serve compensatory and punitive purposes as well as reimbursement purposes.  See, e.g., 
Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 82, at 249 (arguing that costs and fees “seek reparations for so-
ciety as a victim . . . and require offenders to pay substantial (and increasing) amounts in an effort 
to hold them accountable for their actions”).  Additionally, Beckett and Harris argue that fees are 
“de facto penalties” because fees are often included when defining fines, fees are often collected 
in the same manner as fines, and fees often have the same adverse impact that fines have on de-
fendants.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 510. 
 129.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 1. 
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The fees charged to defendants can surpass the fines or restitution 
charges assessed.130  This is particularly true for low-level offenses where 
“court costs and other usage fees have proliferated and grown to the point 
that they can eclipse the fines imposed.”131  For example, in California, the 
fine for failure to show proof of vehicle insurance is $100; however, fee as-
sessments add another $390, and additional fees of $325 are added for fail-
ure to appear or pay, resulting in a total citation charge of $815.132  As with 
fines and restitution, failure to pay fees can be grounds for revocation of 
probation and incarceration.133 
B.  Prohibitions Against Debtors’ Prisons for Criminal Justice Debt 
Recognizing the concerns that arise from incarcerating individuals 
based on their inability to pay debt, courts and legislators have sought to es-
tablish restrictions to prevent the use of debtors’ prisons for criminal justice 
debt. 
1.  Case Law 
Concerns about unequal treatment of the poor in the criminal justice 
system are not a new phenomenon.  In Griffin v. Illinois,134 the United 
States Supreme Court recognized “Providing equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem.”135  The Court remanded 
this case because the appeals court had denied appeals to criminal defend-
ants who had been unable to pay for trial transcripts.136  The Court, relying 
on due process and equal protection concerns, concluded that “[i]n criminal 
trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on 
account of religion, race, or color.”137  In Mayer v. City of Chicago,138 the 
Court extended Griffin to defendants charged with misdemeanors where the 
sentences were limited to fines.139  As the Court stated, “The size of the 
                                                          
 130.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1177. 
 131.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 14. 
 132.  ALEX BENDER ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE 
INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 10 (2015), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-
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 133.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 21; Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 524. 
 134.  351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 135.  Id. at 16. 
 136.  Id. at 20.  
 137.  Id. at 17.  
 138.  404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
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defendant’s pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence 
in a nonfelony than in a felony case.”140 
In the landmark case, Gideon v. Wainwright,141 the Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment requires states to provide counsel for indigent felony de-
fendants.142  To support its ruling, the Court said, “in our adversary system 
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”143 
In 1970, the Court in Williams v. Illinois144 recognized “the greatly in-
creased use of fines as a criminal sanction has made nonpayment a major 
cause of incarceration in this country.”145  The Court held that under the 
equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state could 
not extend the incarceration of an individual who was unable to pay his 
criminal justice debt beyond the maximum statutory term.146  Williams had 
received the maximum sentence for a petty theft conviction: one year in 
prison and a $500 fine.147  He was also assessed $5 in court costs.148  Under 
Illinois law, at the end of their sentences, defendants were required to re-
main in jail at a daily rate of $5 to pay off their monetary obligations.149  
For Williams, who was unable to pay the $505 in fines and costs, this trans-
lated to an additional 101 days in jail.150 
Relying on concerns expressed in Griffin, the Court found that it 
would be “impermissible discrimination” to allow imprisonment beyond the 
maximum statutory term for defendants who were unable to pay criminal 
justice debt.151  Specifically, the Court found that “once the State has 
defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological 
interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted 
defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum 
solely by reason of their indigency.”152 
The following year, the Court applied the reasoning from Williams to a 
situation where the legislature had limited sentencing to fines.  In Tate v. 
Short,153 a Texas corporation court convicted the defendant of nine traffic 
                                                          
 140.  Id. at 196. 
 141.  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 142.  Id. at 343–44. 
 143.  Id. at 344. 
 144.  399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 145.  Id. at 240. 
 146.  Id. at 240–41. 
 147.  Id. at 236. 
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offenses and assessed fines totaling $425.154  The defendant was indigent 
and unable to pay the fines.155  The trial court, relying on Texas law that 
permitted incarceration at a rate of $5 per day to pay off fines, sentenced 
him to eighty-five days.156  Upon review, the United States Supreme Court 
found that converting a fine-only restriction to a prison sentence for an in-
digent unable to pay the fine violated the Equal Protection Clause.157  The 
Court added that since the legislature had restricted punishment in traffic 
offenses to fines, imprisonment of an indigent would not “further any penal 
objective of the State.”158  Moreover, according to the Court, instead of 
generating revenue, imprisonment would “saddle[] the State with the cost of 
feeding and housing him for the period of his imprisonment.”159 
In Bearden v. Georgia,160 the Court relied on Williams and Tate in 
holding that a court should assess an individual’s ability to pay before re-
voking probation and incarcerating him for failure to pay a fine or restitu-
tion.161  In 1980, Danny Bearden pleaded guilty to charges of burglary and 
theft.162  The Georgia trial court, relying on the state’s first offender’s act, 
deferred his proceedings and sentenced him to three years’ probation.163  
The court also assessed a $500 fine and $250 in restitution as a condition of 
probation.164  Bearden paid $200 upfront and agreed to pay the remaining 
$550 within four months.165  Approximately one month later, Bearden lost 
his job, leaving him with no other sources of income.166  Despite his efforts, 
Bearden, who was illiterate and had not completed high school, was unable 
to find another job.167  Because he failed to pay, the trial court revoked 
Bearden’s probation and ordered that he be incarcerated for the remainder 
of the probationary term.168 
In evaluating the revocation, the Court determined that the original 
probation decision reflected a conclusion “that the State’s penological inter-
ests do not require imprisonment.”169  The Court found that “[b]y 
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sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could not pay the 
fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety 
of reducing the fine or extending the time for payments or making 
alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison 
sentence.”170  Accordingly, the Court established that before incarcerating 
an individual, courts should investigate the reasons for non-payment.171  If 
it turns out “the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine 
or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is 
fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering 
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are 
available.”172  Similarly, state courts have also recognized the need to assess 
individuals’ financial condition before incarcerating them because of their 
inability to pay criminal justice debt.173 
2.  Legislation and Court Rules 
In addition to case law, states have also adopted legislation and court 
rules to codify the protections established by Bearden.  For example, the 
Oklahoma Rules of Criminal Procedure require that district and municipal 
courts hold a hearing and make a determination of a “defendant’s ability to 
immediately satisfy the fines and costs.”174  Under New Mexico law, the 
court may use contempt procedures for failure to make payment on criminal 
justice debt, and a defendant, as a defense, can assert that he did not 
willfully refuse to pay or that he made a good-faith effort to pay.175  Texas 
law provides that the court shall allow installment payments if it determines 
that a misdemeanant is unable to pay assessed fines and costs immediate-
ly.176 
                                                          
 170.  Id. at 674. 
 171.  Id. at 672. 
 172.  Id. at 668–69 (footnote omitted). 
 173.  See, e.g., Massey v. Meadows, 321 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Ga. 1984) (holding “that where 
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 175.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-12-3(C)–(D) (2009). 
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III.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT AND THE RESURGENCE OF DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
Despite the statutory and case law restrictions, the growth in criminal 
justice debt has been associated with a dramatic increase in arrest and incar-
ceration of defendants who are unable to pay legal financial obligations.  
The same concerns that led to calls for the abolition of debtors’ prisons in 
Europe have now returned as the current system is increasingly charging 
defendants for services provided, is unfairly discriminating against the poor, 
and is creating conflicts of interest in the assessment and collection of 
criminal justice debt.  This Part will address the growth in criminal justice 
debt, the use of debtors’ prisons, and these renewed concerns. 
A.  The Growth in Criminal Justice Debt and Offender Funding 
Criminal justice debt has increased dramatically during the last forty 
years.  Courts have imposed legal financial obligations on “[sixty-six per-
cent] of felons sentenced to prison, and more than [eighty percent] of other 
felons and misdemeanants.”177  Additionally, other criminal agencies—
including jails, prisons, and public defender offices—charge fees to defend-
ants.178  Commentators estimate “that tens of millions of U.S. residents 
have been assessed financial penalties by the courts and other criminal 
agencies.”179 
The most common reasons asserted for the growth in monetary sanc-
tions are the expansion in the use of incarceration since 1970 and budgetary 
pressures at the state and local level.180  As the National Research Council 
concluded in its 2014 report on incarceration, “The growth in incarceration 
rates in the United States over the past [forty] years is historically unprece-
dented and internationally unique.”181  The United States is the undisputed 
leader in the use of incarceration.182  Nearly one-quarter of the prisoners in 
the world are in the United States, even though more than ninety-five per-
cent of the world’s population is outside the United States.183  Since the 
1970s, the United States has more than quadrupled its rate of incarcera-
tion.184 
                                                          
 177.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 515. 
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Approximately one percent of adults are incarcerated.185  Between 
1983 and 2013 annual admissions to jails increased from 6 million to 11.7 
million while the average daily number of jail inmates rose from 224,000 to 
731,000.186  Increases in the number of people on probation and parole have 
contributed to the growth in incarceration as a result of failures to abide by 
conditions of parole or probation.187  At the end of 2013, more than 4.75 
million individuals were on probation or parole.188  As a result, approxi-
mately one in every thirty-five adults was subject to incarceration, parole, 
or probation.189 
High incarceration rates have created burdens on state and local budg-
ets to fund the expenses of incarceration, parole, and probation.190  In re-
sponse, many states and localities have turned to offender-based funding.191  
Additionally, some jurisdictions use criminal justice debt to fund expenses 
outside of the criminal justice system.192  For example, the Department of 
Justice’s report on Ferguson reported that the city’s 2015 budget reflected 
that collections of fines and fees would account for more than twenty-three 
percent of the city’s projected general fund revenues.193 
While all monetary assessments have increased, the largest percentage 
increase has been in fees.194  A recent NPR survey found that since 2010, 
                                                          
 185.  See LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
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come, respectively.  THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS 
WHITE PAPER 28, 31, 34 (2014), http://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-
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 193.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 10 (stating that the projected revenue from fines 
and fees was $3.09 million, while total expected revenue was $13.26 million). 
 194.  Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 1769–71; McCormack, supra note 113, at 229 
(recognizing the “recent innovations in fee collection”). 
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forty-eight states have increased their fees.195  A nationwide survey found 
that the percentage of state and federal felony inmates with court-imposed 
monetary sanctions increased from 25% in 1991 to 66% in 2004.196  
Between 1991 and 2004, the percentage of felony inmates assessed 
restitution and fees increased from approximately 10% to approximately 
25% and 35%, respectively, while the percentage of felons assessed fees 
increased from approximately 10% to over 50%.197  Moreover, this data un-
derestimates the total amount of monetary sanctions, as it only covers court-
imposed assessments on felons sentenced to prison.198  Additional statistics 
reflect, “felons sentenced to probation and misdemeanants are more likely 
than felons sentenced to prison to receive monetary sanctions.”199  Non-
judicial sources, including prosecutors and prison officials, also assess 
fees.200 
Responding to budgetary concerns, many states and localities have al-
so outsourced traditional public services, such as prison, probation, moni-
toring, and collection services to private companies.201  The growth in pri-
vatization of state prisons from 1999 to 2010 has been described as a 
“seismic shift.”202  During this time span, the percentage of prisoners in pri-
vate state prisons increased by 40% while the total prison population grew 
by 18%.203 
Similarly, many jurisdictions now rely on private probation companies 
to monitor and supervise defendants, and these firms will typically charge 
                                                          
 195.  State-by-State Court Fees, supra note 121.  Alaska and North Dakota are the only states 
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ject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf.  Aviram also noted that the growth in 
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Id.  
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defendants enrollment fees as well as monthly supervisory fees.204  Privati-
zation of probation services reportedly began in the 1970s when Florida 
delegated monitoring of misdemeanants on probation to the Salvation Ar-
my.205  Currently, more than 1000 courts located in at least twelve states 
annually use private probation companies to monitor “[h]undreds of thou-
sands of Americans.”206  Often, the companies will market their services to 
local entities as “zero cost solution[s],” claiming that they will fund their 
operations solely based on funds received from defendants.207  Under these 
“offender-funded” probation models, private companies claim that public 
expenditures are not necessary for their services.208 
Determining the total amount of supervisory fees that private proba-
tion companies collect is difficult because the companies are typically pri-
vately held, and states do not require reporting of their collections.209  Hu-
man Rights Watch, an independent international organization, found that 
$40 million was a conservative estimate of the annual revenue that private 
probation companies in Georgia collected in 2013.210  The private probation 
companies consist of both small and large firms.211  Judicial Correction 
Services and Sentinel Offender Services are two of the largest private pro-
bation companies.212  The collection practices of these businesses have been 
the subject of litigation and criticism.213  For example, a settlement with 
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Montgomery, Alabama requires a three-year ban on contracts with private 
probation companies.214 
B.  The Rise of Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons 
Despite the statutory and case law prohibitions, the incarceration of 
indigents for failure to pay has increased along with the growth of criminal 
justice debt.215  Failure to pay LFOs has resulted in “a significant number of 
warrants, arrests, probation revocations, jail stays, and prison admissions in 
locales across the country.”216  For example, one estimate is that half the ar-
rests and up to one-quarter of the incarcerations in Ohio in 2010 were for 
fines and costs.217  From July 2004 to July 2013, the percentage of monthly 
bookings in the Tulsa Jail involving warrants for the failure to pay criminal 
justice debt for state, non-felony charges increased from eight to twenty-
nine percent.218  Other examples include reports that fifteen percent of the 
inmates in one county in Washington were incarcerated for failure to pay 
criminal justice debt, while seventeen percent of pre-trial commitments in 
Rhode Island were due to failure to pay court debt.219  Moreover, a 2010 
study of the fifteen states with the highest prison populations found that all 
of the states made criminal justice debt a condition of supervision and 
arrested individuals for failure to pay or appear at hearings related to the 
failure to pay.220  In many cases, defendants were incarcerated for days be-
fore any hearing on ability to pay.221  Similarly, a study of municipalities in 
Missouri found that people who could not afford a bond after arrest for a 
failure to pay, could “spend as much as three weeks in jail waiting to see a 
judge.”222 
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In many cases, courts have ignored or weakened the ability to pay 
analysis required by legislation and case law.223  Often courts do not make 
any determinations of an individual’s ability to pay.224  A study that focused 
on the municipal courts in the Missouri cities of Bel-Ridge, Florissant, and 
Ferguson found that the courts “rarely” inquired into defendants’ ability to 
pay.225  The failure to inquire violates Missouri law that courts “shall, inso-
far as practicable, proportion the fine to the burden that payment will im-
pose in view of the financial resources of an individual.”226 
In February 2015, Equal Justice Under Law, ArchCity Defenders, and 
the Saint Louis University School of Law filed federal class action 
complaints against the Missouri cities of Ferguson and Jennings asserting 
violations of the constitutional rights of indigents who were imprisoned 
because they were unable to pay criminal justice debt arising from minor 
offenses.227  The offenses included traffic tickets.228  Describing the munic-
ipal jails as “debtors’ prison[s],”229 the complaints allege that the plaintiffs 
have been relegated to overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary conditions and 
denied medication and proper nutrition.230  The complaints describe sui-
cides and suicide attempts by indigent individuals unable to make the nec-
essary payments to be released from confinement.231  The complaints assert 
that the cities have violated federal and state law by creating a policy and 
practice of jailing indigents without determining their ability to pay crimi-
nal justice debt or considering alternatives to incarceration.232  The 
                                                          
 223.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 5 (“courts across the United States rou-
tinely disregard the protections and principles the Supreme Court established in Bearden v. Geor-
gia”). 
 224.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 21 (indicating that “defenders in at least five of the [fif-
teen] surveyed states reported instances where they believed courts had either failed to consider 
ability to pay altogether or used an unreasonable standard for determining ability to pay”).  
 225. HARVEY ET AL., supra note 192, at 3, 9; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.H., 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1–2 (2015), http://aclu-nh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Final-ACLU-Debtors-Prisons-Report-9.23.15.pdf (finding that “in 2013 
New Hampshire judges jailed people who were unable to pay fines and without conducting a 
meaningful ability-to-pay hearing in an estimated 148 cases”). 
 226.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 53 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 560.026 (2012)). 
 227.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1; Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Jenkins v. City of 
Jennings, No. 14:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [hereinafter 
Jennings Complaint]. 
 228.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1; Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, ¶ 1. 
 229.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 6; Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, ¶ 7. 
 230.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 2; Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, ¶ 2. 
 231.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 122, 206 n.21 (noting “[a]t least four suicides and 
suicide attempts by people held because they were too poor to pay for their release have occurred 
in local municipal jails just in the past five months”); Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, ¶¶ 3, 
238 n.21 (same). 
 232.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9, 164; Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, ¶¶ 10, 
186. 
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complaints further allege that over the last five years the cities have 
improperly incarcerated hundreds of indigent individuals for non-payment 
of criminal justice debt.  In addition, the cities allegedly placed thousands 
of indigents on payment plans for criminal justice debt for minor offenses 
who are now under threat of arrest and incarceration for failure to pay.233  
The complaints also allege that the cities have failed to provide adequate 
representation to those incarcerated.234  City officials from Ferguson dispute 
the “accuracy of many of the allegations” and have stated that the city’s 
policy is to “not to discuss lawsuits that are pending in litigation.”235  Since 
the February 2015 filings in Ferguson and Jennings, at least seven other 
lawsuits alleging the operation of debtors’ prisons by municipalities have 
been filed.236 
In instances where courts do have hearings, they often rely on broad 
definitions of willfulness to justify a finding that non-payment is based on 
willful failure rather than inability to pay.237  For example, public defenders 
claim that some judges have failed to conduct hearings properly and have 
found willful failure because non-paying defendants had admitted to smok-
ing or having cable television.238 
Moreover, indigents often do not have counsel at these hearings.239  In 
some states, non-payment is treated as civil contempt, and defendants may 
not have a right to counsel.240  In other cases, as a practical matter, defend-
                                                          
 233.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 213–15; Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, 
¶¶ 246–48. 
 234.  Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 215; Jennings Complaint, supra note 227, ¶ 248. 
 235.  Press Release, City of Ferguson (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://localtvktvi.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/ferguson-media-statement-regarding-lawsuit.pdf. 
 236.  See Class Action Complaint, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1–2 (federal lawsuit filed in October 2015 
against the City of Austin, Texas alleging incarceration of individuals unable to pay criminal jus-
tice debt); Shapiro, supra note 12 (identifying six other lawsuits alleging debtors’ prisons filed 
against municipalities in September and October 2015). 
 237.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 526 (stating that “the definition of ‘willful’ nonpay-
ment that is emerging in case law is as broad as the legal definition of discrimination is narrow”).  
 238.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 21–22; see also Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Goldie, 119 
Ohio St. 3d 428, 2008-Ohio-4606, 894 N.E.2d 1226, at ¶¶ 17–18 (involving the public reprimand 
of a judge who failed to follow the state’s requirements for determining ability to pay before in-
carcerating a defendant for failure to pay a fine). 
 239.  See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.H., supra note 225, at 1–2 (identifying lack 
of representation in hearings in New Hampshire).  Additionally, a recent class action complaint 
filed against the City of Biloxi, Mississippi, also alleges constitutional violations for incarcerating 
defendants for failure to pay LFOs by not holding ability to pay hearings and by not providing 
indigent defendants with court-appointed counsel.  Class Action Complaint ¶ 9, Kennedy v. City 
of Biloxi, Miss., No. 1:15-cv-00348-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/complaint_kennedy_v._city_of_biloxi.pdf 
[hereinafter Biloxi Complaint]. 
 240.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 22; see also ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 9 (2012), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Criminal%20Justice%20Debt
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ants are not provided counsel or decline counsel because they fear they will 
be charged additional fees that they cannot afford.241 
For example, a 2015 federal lawsuit in Georgia asserts that DeKalb 
County, the Chief Judge of the DeKalb County’s Recorder Court, and 
Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (“JCS”) violated Kevin Thompson’s 
constitutional rights by failing to provide counsel and an indigency hearing 
before revoking his probation and jailing him when he was unable to pay 
traffic fines and fees.242  Unable to pay an $810 fine for driving with a sus-
pended license, Thompson was assigned pay-only probation through 
JCS.243  Thompson, a nineteen-year-old, was no longer able to serve as a 
tow-truck driver because of the suspension of his license.244  His efforts to 
replace his lost income by borrowing from relatives and looking for 
alternative employment were not successful.245  JCS served Thompson with 
a Petition of Revocation of Probation asserting that he had failed to make 
required payments of fines and fees and ordering him to appear in court.246  
The Petition did not notify him that indigent defendants had a right to free 
court-appointed counsel at revocation proceedings for failure to pay.247  
Purportedly, the JCS officer also misrepresented that he would have to pay 
a $150 fee for a public defender and failed to disclose his right to seek a 
waiver of the fee.248  Not understanding that he could seek a waiver of the 
fee, Thompson waived his right to a public defender because he could not 
afford the fee.249  At the revocation hearing, Thompson was allegedly not 
informed of his right to counsel.250  A JCS representative told the court that 
if Thompson did not pay all of his fees and fines on the date of the hearing, 
                                                          
%20Background%20for%20web.pdf (noting that “Florida, Georgia, and Ohio refuse to recognize 
a right to counsel in civil proceedings that could result in incarceration”).  
 241. PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 240, at 9; Gottschalk, supra note 13, at 490 (stating “many 
poor defendants are apparently waiving their right to counsel to avoid having to go into debt to 
repay the cost of an assigned public defender”). 
 242.  Thompson Complaint, supra note 213, ¶¶ 38–43, 102–06 (alleging violations of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to provide counsel, failure to provide 
notice of right to counsel, and misrepresentation regarding cost of counsel); Press Release, Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Challenges Abusive Debt Collection Practices That Target the Poor 
(Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice/aclu-challenges-debt-
collection-practices-target-poor.  
 243.  Thompson Complaint, supra note 213, ¶¶ 22–23.  For a discussion of pay-only probation, 
see infra notes 283 to 289 and accompanying text. 
 244.  Thompson Complaint, supra note 242, ¶¶ 9, 51. 
 245.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 17, 27–31. 
 246.  Id. ¶¶ 33–35. 
 247.  Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
 248.  Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 249.  Id. ¶¶ 41–43. 
 250.  Id. ¶ 46. 
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he should be jailed.251  The court agreed and sentenced Thompson to nine 
days.252 
In jurisdictions that permit exemptions from incarceration based on 
inability to pay, many individuals fail to apply because “the process . . . is 
poorly defined or overly complicated.”253  Some jurisdictions may require 
the defendant to apply for indigency relief rather than having the court 
make an affirmative finding of indigency before incarceration.  For 
example, New York law requires the defendant to request resentencing to 
avoid incarceration for inability to pay a fine.254  In California, defendants, 
often unknowingly, waive their rights to ability-to-pay hearings under the 
state’s vehicle code because courts fail to notify defendants of their 
rights.255 
C.  The Disparate Impact of Criminal Justice Debt on the Poor and 
Minorities 
Although the growth of criminal justice debt has affected millions of 
Americans, those least able to afford the sanctions have suffered the most.  
While fees have become commonplace in modern society as reflected in the 
charging of fees by such institutions as banks, utilities, and airlines, 
monetary sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system “carry 
repercussions of a different order, amplifying as they often do the already 
severe indebtedness of those who are entrapped within its net.”256  Those 
who can afford to pay criminal justice debt can escape this net while those 
who are unable to pay become enmeshed in what often seems to be a never-
ending poverty cycle.  The adverse impact of this two-tiered system on the 
poor and minorities is reflected in disproportionate assessment of fees, addi-
tional monetary sanctions, barriers to re-entry, and stress on families. 
The shooting death of Michael Brown and subsequent protests in Fer-
guson, Missouri have prompted renewed calls for investigation into the 
treatment of minorities and the poor in the criminal justice system.257  An-
ecdotal and empirical evidence illustrate how the system adversely affects 
                                                          
 251.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 252.  Id. ¶ 54. 
 253.  PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 240, at 14.  Patel and Philip’s Brennan Center Report char-
acterized the courts’ treatment of “‘willful failure to pay’ as ill-defined and amorphous, exacerbat-
ing existing confusions.”  Id. at 22. 
 254.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §§ 420.10(3), (5) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2015). 
 255.  BENDER ET AL., supra note 132, at 16 (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 42003(c) (West 2014)). 
 256.  Katzenstein & Nagrecha, supra note 26, at 561. 
 257.  Amy R. Connolly, Justice Dept. Examining Ferguson Racial Discrimination, UPI.COM 
(Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/02/19/Justice-Dept-examining-
Ferguson-racial-discrimination/6031424340081/; Zachary Roth, Movement Sparked by Ferguson 
Has Come a Long Way, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/movement-sparked-ferguson-has-come-long-way. 
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these groups.258  Statistics reflect that prisoners are “overwhelmingly 
poor”259 and “overwhelmingly, people of color.”260  Given the 
“substantially higher rates of incarceration” for the poor and minorities, 
“the effects of harsh penal policies in the past [forty] years have fallen most 
heavily on blacks and Hispanics, especially the poorest.”261  While white 
males have a 5.9% chance of incarceration during their lifetime, Hispanic 
males have a 17% chance, and black males have a 32% chance.262  As of 
December 31, 2013, approximately 3% of black males were imprisoned, 
while 0.5% of white males were imprisoned.263  The disparity is also evi-
dent in jails, where blacks and Hispanics represent more than half of the 
inmates but less than one-third of the general population.264  Moreover, 
59% of jailed inmates “earned less than $1,000 per month before their arrest 
and . . . 29% . . . were unemployed.”265 
Similarly, criminal justice debt has a disparate impact on the poor and 
minorities.266  For example, forty-three states now impose a fee for an indi-
gent’s “free” public defender.267   More than 80% of defendants qualify for 
the right to have appointed counsel.268  Black defendants are nearly “five 
times more likely than white defendants to” use appointed counsel, making 
them particularly susceptible to incurring more criminal justice debt in the 
form of public defender fees.269  In addition, black defendants are more 
likely than white defendants to remain in jail until trial because they are un-
able to post bail.270  The discretionary nature of fees and fines makes them 
“especially vulnerable to ethnic and other disparities.”271  For example, the 
Department of Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police Department (“FPD”) 
reflects the disparate impact on African-Americans where, “[d]espite mak-
ing up 67% of the population, African Americans accounted for 85% of 
                                                          
 258.  Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon,  The Dirty Little Secrets About Pay-to-Stay, 106 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 67 (2007), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1133&context=mlr_fi (“The dirty 
little secret is out; people with more money get a better deal in our criminal justice system.”). 
 259.  Levingston & Turetsky, supra note 82, at 187. 
 260.  Id. at 188. 
 261.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 5. 
 262.  Levenson & Gordon, supra note 258, at 67. 
 263.  E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 
24247282, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 2 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. 
 264.  SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 15. 
 265.  Levenson & Gordon, supra note 258, at 67. 
 266.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 4. 
 267.  Shapiro, supra note 26; State-by-State Court Fees, supra note 121. 
 268.  BANNON ET AL, supra note 37, at 4. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 15. 
 271.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 522. 
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FPD’s traffic stops, 90% of FPD’s citations, and 93% of FPD’s arrests from 
2012 to 2014.”272 
Financial sanctions also disproportionately impact those at lower in-
come levels.273  Typically, fines and fees in the United States system are 
imposed without consideration of the income of defendants.274  As a result, 
these monetary sanctions represent a larger percentage of the earning power 
of low-income defendants than of higher income defendants.275 
Moreover, the imposition of criminal justice debt makes it harder for 
already impoverished inmates to ever escape poverty.276  Those unable to 
pay not only continue to remain in the criminal justice system but also are 
frequently assessed additional fees, referred to by critics as “poverty 
penalties,” because such charges only arise for individuals who are unable 
to pay the original monetary sanctions.277  Poverty penalties, consisting of 
interest, late charges, and collection fees, can put indigent defendants in an 
“endless cycle of debt.”278  Payment or installment plans, arguably designed 
to help those in need, may make matters worse by charging payment fees to 
participate.279  Fourteen of the fifteen states with the highest prison popula-
tions impose poverty penalties.280  The penalties can have a detrimental im-
pact on the poor.281  For example, a study of criminal justice debt in 
Washington state found that using the median criminal justice debt amount 
of $7234, a defendant paying $100 per month, representing 15% of his 
expected monthly earnings, would—based on the accrual of interest 
charges—still owe nearly $900 after ten years.282 
The two-tiered nature of the system is most apparent in situations de-
scribed as “pay-only” probation where courts impose probation solely be-
cause the defendant is unable to pay fines or court costs upfront.283  If the 
accused had funds to pay the fines, the defendant would not end up on pro-
bation and would no longer be in the system.  Defendants unable to pay 
fines upfront are subject to additional fees and remain in the system, even 
                                                          
 272.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 62. 
 273.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 10 (describing the system as one “in 
which the poorest defendants are punished more harshly than those with means”). 
 274.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 509. 
 275.  Id. at 516 (explaining that for the “poor and disadvantaged population . . . legal debt is 
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 276.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 2.  
 277.  Id. at 1, 13. 
 278.  Id. at 1. 
 279.  PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 240, at 17. 
 280.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 17. 
 281.  Id. at 17–18. 
 282.  Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 1776–77. 
 283.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 25–27. 
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though they pose no threat to society and their underlying offenses, such as 
traffic violations, typically do not require incarceration.284 
The problems become even more troubling when private probation 
companies are involved.285  Generally, contracts with private probation 
companies require courts to assess monthly supervision fees, ranging from 
$35 to $100.286  As these monthly fees accumulate, they can create substan-
tial burdens for low-income individuals and can even exceed the initial 
fines assessed.287  Failure to pay these fees can be grounds for revocation of 
probation, which may result in the probationer’s incarceration.288  When 
used in the “pay-only” probation context, the monthly supervision fees cre-
ate a poverty tax on defendants because they could not pay the fines or 
court costs upfront.289  Moreover, the continuous accrual of monthly fees is 
discriminatory against low-income individuals, creating a situation where 
“the poorer you are, the more you ultimately pay.”290 
The poverty cycle is often inescapable because criminal justice debt 
hampers efforts at re-entry into society.291  Criminal justice debt negatively 
impacts credit scores, which can result in the denial of credit, housing, and 
employment opportunities.292  Additionally, failure to make criminal debt 
payments can lead to suspension of driving privileges, affecting the ability 
to obtain and keep jobs.293  Once a driver’s license is suspended, reinstate-
ment and late fees are added to the original fine, and an individual must pay 
this debt before she can regain her license.294  California courts have sus-
pended more than four million licenses for failure to pay criminal justice 
debt.295  Similarly, outstanding criminal justice debt may result in denial of 
the right to vote.296 
                                                          
 284.  Id. at 25. 
 285.  For a description of some of the financial hardships private probation companies impose 
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Failure to pay legal financial obligations is also a condition of proba-
tion or parole, and violations of probation or parole can in turn result in de-
nial of federal benefits—including food stamps, social security, and housing 
assistance.297  Often low-income defendants have to choose between paying 
criminal justice debt and buying necessities.298  For example, Regina Rob-
erts, a single grandmother, whose sole income was disability payments, had 
to choose between making criminal justice debt payments and medical debt 
payments related to her lung disease and bipolar disorder.299  She had been 
assessed nearly $7000 in LFOs following a welfare fraud conviction due to 
a caseworker’s error in reporting her income when she sought recertifica-
tion for her food stamps.300  A probation officer rejected Ms. Roberts’ pay-
ments as too small and had the court extend her original two-year probation 
term for an additional two years.301 
The impact of criminal justice debt is not limited to defendants.  Col-
lectors may seek recovery from jointly held assets and may even be able to 
garnish the earnings of a defendant’s spouse.302  Funds that may otherwise 
be used to support spouses and children are often used to pay criminal jus-
tice debt.303  A report based on interviews with defendants about the 
consequences of criminal justice debt found that families and friends often 
provide the financial resources to prevent re-incarceration stating, “[e]ven 
assuming that it is the returning prisoner who has ‘done the crime,’ it is 
often up to . . . friends and family members to help pay the time.”304 
While coping with civil debt issues is difficult for the poor and minori-
ties, criminal justice debt issues often create greater concerns.  Unlike civil 
debt, criminal justice debt is typically not subject to discharge in bankrupt-
cy and carries with it the threat of arrest and incarceration.305  When ser-
vices are outsourced to private parties, collectors obtain remedies that 
would not be otherwise permissible in civil collection.306  For example, pri-
vate probation companies can threaten revocation of probation to collect 
                                                          
 297.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 28; Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 1762. 
 298.  COOK, supra note 41, at 24; EISEN, supra note 39, at 2. 
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their supervision fees.307  To put this information into context, Human 
Rights Watch describes how defendants could be in a better situation by 
taking out a loan with exorbitant terms: 
 An offender who requires 24 months on probation to pay off a 
$1,200 fine, with a $35 monthly supervision fee, would be 
financially better off taking out a $1,200, 24-month loan with an 
APR of 50 percent. She would also not have to face the direct 
threat of incarceration over missed payments, as she would while 
on probation.308 
Additionally, non-monetary probation requirements may discriminate 
against the poor.  For example, court-imposed probation required Quentone 
Moore to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet; however, the monitoring 
bracelet required a landline telephone.  Being homeless, Moore was unable 
to comply with the landline requirement and wound up spending fifty-two 
days in jail.309 
D.  Conflicts of Interest and Distrust in the Criminal Justice System 
The current system of assessing and collecting criminal justice debt 
has created distrust and conflict of interest issues similar to the concerns 
voiced by opponents of debtors’ prisons in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.310  Distrust of the legal system by the poor and minorities is not a 
new issue.311  As recognized by the Supreme Court, “Justice, if it can be 
measured, must be measured by the experience the average citizen has with 
the police and the lower courts.”312  For many people, their experience with 
the justice system is based on their interactions with the municipal court.313  
For those who are assessed with criminal justice debt that they are unable to 
pay and threatened with arrest, their measure of justice becomes character-
ized by distrust and fear.314  The fear of arrest for failure to pay criminal 
justice debt can cause individuals to avoid seeking necessary legal or medi-
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cal help.315  The same fear can result in reluctance to show up at their work-
place.316  In certain situations, the imposition of criminal justice debt can 
encourage individuals to commit crimes to obtain the funds necessary to 
pay criminal justice debt.317 
Where racially discriminatory practices exist or appear to exist, dis-
trust can rise to even greater levels.  These situations can result in concerns 
about racial profiling.318  For example, the Ferguson Police Department has 
been accused of “us[ing] racially discriminatory practices in targeting 
minorities for minor offenses and putting them in jail if they can’t pay 
fines.”319  The Department of Justice’s report found “substantial evidence of 
racial bias among police and court staff in Ferguson.”320 
The dramatic increase in the level of criminal justice debt at a time of 
budgetary shortfalls has created an impression that criminal justice debts are 
imposed primarily for collecting revenue rather than serving a penological 
rationale.321  Concerns about revenue collection are generally greater in 
economically depressed counties, putting more pressure on those least like-
ly to afford the burden of criminal justice debt.322  The use of criminal jus-
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adverse ways”). 
 316.  Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 26, at 1761. 
 317.  COOK, supra note 41, at 11 (reporting that seventeen percent of those surveyed in Ala-
bama admitted to committing crimes to obtain money to pay criminal justice debt and that the 
number was greater when the interviewer was independent rather than a criminal justice officer); 
see Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670–71 (1983) (revoking probation of someone who does 
not have the ability to pay “may have the perverse effect of inducing the probationer to use illegal 
means to acquire funds to pay in order to avoid revocation”); Katzenstein & Nagrecha, supra note 
26, at 566 (recognizing “[t]o the extent that the excessive burdens of debt direct the poor toward 
additional crime, the failure to make payments on state monies owed leads to reincarceration, and 
responsibility as valued behavior simply cannot be learned by overwhelming individuals who are 
already struggling financially, reason exists on all sides of the aisle to reverse the direction of the 
growing debt collection regime”); see also Westen, supra note 85, at 795 (referring to the 1968 
President’s Commission on Riots and Civil Disorders for the conclusion that “the belief is ‘perva-
sive’ in ghetto areas that the courts in imposing fines discriminate against the poor, that the judi-
cial system has become an object of distrust, and that this distrust has increased the level of 
crime”). 
 318.  HARVEY ET AL., supra note 192, at 13 (report of certain municipalities in Missouri claim-
ing that “the current policies adopted by the municipal court system lead to the impression of the 
courts and municipalities as racist institutions that care much more about collecting money—
generally from poor, black residents—than about dispensing justice”).  
 319.  Connolly, supra note 257. 
 320.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 5. 
 321.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 8 (recognizing that criminal justice debt 
represents a “critical revenue stream” for otherwise inadequately funded justice systems). 
 322.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 14. 
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tice debt to fund unrelated activities of states and localities “effectively 
turn[s] courts, clerks, and probation officers into general tax collectors.”323 
Imposing criminal justice debt on the poor to fund the court system creates 
potential conflicts of interests for judges who face conflicting concerns over 
providing justice and collecting revenue.324  The practice “can interfere with 
the judiciary’s independent constitutional role . . . and, in its most extreme 
form, threaten the impartiality of judges and other court personnel.”325  
Similarly, for probation and parole officers, the traditional role of supervis-
ing and monitoring individuals to protect the public and prevent new of-
fenses is often in conflict with the new role of debt collector.326 
The problem of conflicts of interest may be even more dramatic with 
the privatization of services.327  As more states and localities have turned to 
privatizing prisons, jails, supervision, and collection, the incentives for 
these third parties to profit are often in conflict with the goals of the 
criminal justice system.328  For example, private probation companies who 
typically provide their services at no charge to municipalities, rely solely on 
fees collected from the persons that they monitor.329  As a result, for these 
companies, “every person who successfully completes probation is a lost 
source of revenue.”330  Additionally, the private parties may act without ad-
                                                          
 323.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 30. 
 324.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 9 (referring to the acknowledgement by 
the chief judge of the New Orleans criminal court that “it creates an appearance of impropriety 
when judges must rely in part on collecting LFOs from poor defendants to keep their courts run-
ning”). 
 325.  Id.  Another concern arises with part-time justices who have non-judicial roles in the sys-
tem.  See, e.g., HARVEY ET AL., supra note 192, at 11 (describing situations in Missouri where 
part-time municipal judges may also serve as prosecutors in other municipalities). 
 326.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 31. 
 327.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1213 (describing how “[r]isk also spikes when private 
vendors get involved”).  But see John Archibald, Alabama’s For-Profit Courts Turn American 
Dream into Nightmare, AL.COM (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/11/alabamas_for-profit_courts_tur.html (arguing that 
merely eliminating government use of private probation companies does not eliminate conflicts as 
government, too, can act for profit rather than justice).  
 328.  See, e.g., Aviram, supra note 201, at 132 (stating that “the emergence of private proba-
tion outfits has led to allegations that probationary decision-making has shifted from ostensibly 
neutral courts to for-profit corporations looking to reap financial gain by using probation as a tool 
to fine and fee cash-strapped individuals”); Developments in the Law: Policing, supra note 307, at 
1729–30. 
 329.  Radley Balko, A Debtors’ Prison in Mississippi, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/10/21/a-debtors-prison-in-
mississippi/.  For more detail about private probation companies relying solely on collections from 
probationers, see supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text. 
 330.  See Balko, supra note 329 (asserting that “if you hire a probation company on a contract 
that makes probations the sole source of the company’s revenue, that company will have a strong 
incentive to treat probationers more as cash machines than as human beings”). 
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equate supervision by the court or local government.331  The lack of 
oversight leads to accountability issues and creates the potential for corrup-
tion.332 
IV.  A FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING INCARCERATION OF INDIGENTS WHO 
FAIL TO PAY CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT 
Given the return of debtors’ prisons as well as the historical concerns 
that led to calls for their abolition, it is time to implement more effective 
alternatives to reduce the incidence of incarceration of individuals who are 
unable to pay legal financial obligations.  This Part evaluates some of the 
current proposals—namely abolishing monetary sanctions, basing fines on 
earnings, and enforcing current laws.  This Part then recommends a hybrid 
approach and suggests modifications to broaden the scope and enforceabil-
ity of the current proposals. 
A.  Alternatives 
1.  Abolish Monetary Sanctions 
Professors Katherine Beckett and Alexes Harris advocate the abolition 
of fees and fines as currently used in the United States criminal justice sys-
tem.333  Based on their analysis, the cost of these sanctions outweighs the 
benefits.334  Their proposal is based on three general concerns: the need for 
                                                          
 331.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 57–61 (describing problems with lack of gov-
ernment or judicial supervision of private probation companies); Developments in the Law: Polic-
ing, supra note 307, at 1729–30 (asserting that when using private probation companies “local 
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hounded”); Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1213–14.  Thompson v. DeKalb County is a recent 
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probation company.  See Thompson Complaint, supra note 213, ¶ 96.  
 332.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 63–67 (discussing accountability and corrup-
tion issues under the current private probation system); Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1213–
14.  
 333.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 519.  Beckett and Harris expressly exclude restitution 
charges from the sanctions that they claim should be abolished.  Id. at 510 (arguing that restitution 
payments differ from fines and fees in that restitution payments are made to specific victims as 
opposed to the government).  For additional support for the abolition approach, see Katzenstein & 
Nagrecha, supra note 26, at 556.  Professor Ruback contends that the restrictions should be lim-
ited to fees and costs.  R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Consider-
ing the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1820 (2015).  Similarly, a re-
cent draft of the Model Penal Code (Second) of Sentencing also proposes that fees and costs be 
abolished.  See Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of 
the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1757–61 (2015) (citing MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04D(2), Alternative § 6.04D(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014)). 
 334.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 519. 
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a “convincing penological rationale,” the unfairness of imposing monetary 
sanctions, and the conflicts of interests created by the system.335 
With respect to the penological justification, they argue that fees and 
fines, as imposed in the United States, do not serve the traditional 
penological goals of “incapacitation, rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
retribution.”336  The discretionary and unpredictable nature of monetary 
sanctions prevents effective deterrence while their disproportionately puni-
tive nature “approaches vengeance rather than retribution.”337  Moreover, 
Beckett and Harris argue the sanctions often are counterproductive and cre-
ate hurdles that prevent re-integration of defendants into society.338 
Beckett and Harris point to the inequity in the imposition of monetary 
sanctions as a reason for abolishing them.  In particular, they identify the 
problems of supplementing prison sentences with monetary sanctions, the 
inherent class bias in assessing monetary sanctions without adjustments for 
income, and the use of incarceration for failure to pay criminal justice 
debt.339  Moreover, as Beckett and Harris note, the sanctions imposed often 
have deleterious impacts on the families of defendants.340 
Finally, Beckett and Harris are concerned about funding the criminal 
justice system through leveling monetary penalties on defendants.341  Spe-
cifically, they are skeptical about whether collections, especially when 
measured against their substantial indirect costs, result in “a net financial 
gain.”342  They contend that the use of a system that relies on fees for fund-
ing can lead to conflicts of interest for judges and other actors involved in 
assessing and collecting fees to support the system.343  Given these con-
cerns, Beckett and Harris suggest that fees and fines, as currently used in 
the United States, should simply be abolished.344 
While the abolition proposal has advantages as a bright-line approach, 
complete abolition seems extreme.  As a practical matter, political and fi-
nancial considerations will likely prevent the complete abolition of mone-
tary sanctions.345  Polls indicate that Americans “overwhelmingly” support 
                                                          
 335.  Id. at 519−28. 
 336.  Id. at 519. 
 337.  Id. at 520. 
 338.  Id.  
 339.  Id. at 521–25. 
 340.  Id. at 523. 
 341.  Id. at 527−28. 
 342.  Id.; see also Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for Fines, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 547, 551 (2011) (relying on Harris and Beckett’s findings and noting that “fees probably 
are at best fiscally neutral because . . . the costs of collection approach the revenue raised,” and 
when factoring in their social costs fees are likely “fiscally counterproductive”). 
 343.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 528. 
 344.  Id. at 528–29.  
 345.  Traci R. Burch, Fixing the Broken System of Financial Sanctions, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 539, 539–41 (2011).  Professor Reitz explains that while the first choice of the draft-
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the idea of offender funding.346  Moreover, given state budgetary concerns, 
states are unlikely to release potential revenue sources.  To the contrary, the 
economic considerations have led to increased growth in fees assessed.347  
Additionally, monetary sanctions can be effective for individuals who can 
pay.348 
2.  Base Fine Amounts on Income Levels 
An alternative to abolishing sanctions is to assess sanctions based on a 
defendant’s income.  Sweden and Germany are examples of countries that 
apply a graduated system known as “day-fines.”349  In countries using a 
day-fine system, fines are typically the primary source of punishment.350  
Day-fines are calculated based on the severity of the crime and the 
defendant’s daily income.351  The goal of the day-fine system is to create 
“an equivalent level of economic burden to offenders of differing means 
who are convicted of similar offenses.”352  As a result, under the day-fine 
system defendants convicted of the same offenses would pay the same per-
centage of their income, meaning that individuals with greater incomes 
would be assessed larger absolute fines.353 
The day-fine system has several advantages over the traditional system 
in America.  First, it has a fairness component so that individuals are as-
sessed the same relative sanction, regardless of their income.354  Additional-
                                                          
ers of the Model Penal Code was to abolish fees and costs, they recognized that in the “short- or 
middle-term” most jurisdictions would not adopt an abolitionist approach, so they included an al-
ternative that would allow for such sanctions subject to “a host of substantive and procedural limi-
tations.”  Reitz, supra note 333, at 1757–60 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 
6.04D(2), Alternative § 6.04D(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014)). 
 346.  Id. at 539–40 (citing surveys conducted by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
and Gallup, including a 1991 survey which found that over ninety percent of respondents favored 
“requiring convicted criminals to pay a substantial share of the cost of their imprisonment” (quot-
ing ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, NATIONAL VICTIMS WEEK STUDY (1991)). 
 347.  Id. at 540–41.  For a discussion of the growth in use of fees, see supra notes 194 to 197 
and accompanying text. 
 348.  Ruback, supra note 82, at 577–78. 
 349.  Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128.  Professors Beckett and Harris affirmatively state 
that their abolition suggestion does not apply to day fine systems.  Beckett & Harris, supra 
note 12, at 519 (asserting that their “analysis pertains only to the imposition of fees and fines in 
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 350.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 514 (noting that “fines serve as an alternative rather 
than as a supplement to incarceration”); Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128 (describing use of 
fines in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden). 
 351.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 514–15; Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128. 
 352.  George F. Cole, Fines Can Be Fine—And Collected: Here’s How, JUDGES’ J., Winter 
1989, at 5, 7. 
 353.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 514–15; Cole, supra note 352, at 7.  
 354.  Cole, supra note 352, at 7.  On the other hand, some commentators assert the day-fine 
system would create proportionality concerns because of the differences in fines for wealthy and 
poor defenders.  See, e.g., O’Malley, supra note 342, at 547.  
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ly, since sanctions are based on a defendant’s ability to pay, collection 
would presumably be easier.355 
Although day-fine systems have been operating in several European 
countries for years, implementation in the United States may be difficult, 
especially given the American penchant for use of imprisonment.356  The 
use of monetary sanctions is substantially different in Europe than in the 
United States.357  While Europe tends to rely on monetary sanctions as the 
sole source of punishment, in the United States, monetary sanctions are of-
ten a supplement to other forms of punishment, including incarceration and 
probation.358  In the United States, fines are typically set at the judge’s dis-
cretion without consideration of defendant’s earnings, and fines often ac-
company prison sentences and probation.359  Generally, American judges do 
not view fines as an adequate alternative to imprisonment or probation.360 
Additionally, the day-fine systems in Europe rely on the courts’ access 
to financial information regarding citizens.  Such information, while availa-
ble in Europe, is generally not available in the United States.361  To imple-
ment a similar system in the United States would require that courts have 
access to defendants’ financial records, such as bank accounts and tax re-
turns.  However, such a system would likely be expensive to implement and 
would raise privacy issues.362 
3.  Enforce Current Laws 
Instead of seeking to abolish monetary sanctions or overhaul the 
system of setting fines, a third alternative is to develop a more effective 
system for enforcing existing laws designed to prevent incarceration of 
indigents.  Prompted by American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) con-
cerns of abuse, in 2014 the Ohio Supreme Court and the Colorado legisla-
                                                          
 355.  Cole, supra note 352, at 7. 
 356.  Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 132 (stating that the most difficult obstacle to imple-
menting day fines “is the modern American preoccupation with absolute severity of punishment 
and the related widespread view that only imprisonment counts”).  Although some pilot day-fine 
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 358.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 514–15; Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128. 
 359.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 514–15; Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128. 
 360.  Tonry & Lynch, supra note 91, at 128 (citing a national survey of judicial attitudes).  
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ture established plans designed to enforce existing laws and end the prob-
lem of incarcerating indigents for failure to pay criminal justice debt.363 
Ohio’s reforms were prompted by reports from the ACLU in 2010 and 
the ACLU of Ohio in 2013.364  A 2010 investigation by the ACLU of five 
states, including Ohio, found that the subject states had improperly incar-
cerated individuals who were unable to pay criminal fines.365  Specifically, 
the 2010 report found that although Ohio has some of the toughest laws 
prohibiting the incarceration of individuals for failure to pay fines and fees, 
Ohio courts were ignoring these restrictions and imprisoning individuals 
who were unable to pay their criminal justice debt.366  After the release of 
the 2010 report, the ACLU of Ohio received notices of abusive practices 
throughout the state, especially from Huron County.367  The ACLU’s re-
view of public records, as well as in-person court observation, revealed 
“egregious evidence of debtors’ prisons practices.”368  Based on these 
findings in Huron County, the ACLU of Ohio conducted a statewide 
investigation of ten other counties finding that “debtors’ prisons practices 
[were] undoubtedly a statewide phenomenon in Ohio, potentially affecting 
thousands of individuals.”369  The 2013 report, based on the a statewide 
investigation, concluded, “[u]ntil the state Supreme Court takes action, 
thousands of Ohioans will continue to be relegated to the outskirts of hope, 
where the crime of poverty sentences them to a vicious cycle of 
incarceration, burdensome fees, and diminishing optimism for a better 
                                                          
 363.  Jeremy Pelzer, Ohio Supreme Court Takes Lead in Cracking Down on Illegal ‘Debtors’ 
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 369.  Id. at 9. 
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life.”370  In April 2013, the ACLU of Ohio demanded that the Ohio Su-
preme Court “promulgate clear rules . . . [to] end debtors’ prisons in 
Ohio.”371 
By February 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court had responded to the call 
for action and taken the lead in establishing reforms aimed at ending incar-
ceration based on the inability to pay criminal justice debt.372  The Ohio 
Plan provides trial judges with a laminated “bench card” with “user-friendly 
encapsulations and graphics” that set forth the restrictions on the use of in-
carceration for criminal justice debt.373  Specifically, the card distinguishes 
between fines and court costs.374  The card states that court costs, including 
fees, are civil debt obligations so that incarceration is not available as a col-
lection method.375 
For fines, incarceration is available only after a determination by the 
court at a hearing that the defendant’s failure to pay is based on a willful re-
fusal to pay as opposed to an inability to pay.376  Defendants are entitled to 
reasonable notice of the hearing and a right to counsel, including a public 
defender.377  If a court rules that the defendant can pay, the judgment must 
include findings of fact regarding defendant’s income, assets, and debts.378 
Moreover, as specified in the bench card, courts cannot use their 
contempt powers to incarcerate someone for failure to pay a fine, and 
“unpaid fines and/or court costs may neither be a condition of probation, 
nor grounds for an extension or violation of probation.”379  The card cau-
tions judges that they are subject to “disciplinary violations” if they fail to 
follow the provisions for the collection of fines.380  In addition to the bench 
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card, the Ohio Supreme Court has established training for judges, probation 
officers, and court employees.381 
Just as an ACLU reports prompted judicial action in Ohio, an ACLU 
investigation led to legislative action in Colorado to deal with debtors’ pris-
ons.382  The Colorado chapter of the ACLU had conducted a two-year study 
that focused on the use of “pay or serve” warrants by the municipal courts 
in three large cities in Colorado.383  These warrants required defendants to 
either pay the full amount of their monetary sanctions or serve jail time to 
pay off their debt.384  As reported in demand letters sent to the mayors of 
Westminster, Northglenn, and Wheat Ridge, the ACLU of Colorado found 
that the municipal courts in these cities incarcerated indigent individuals 
who failed to pay criminal justice debt without consideration of their ability 
to pay.385 
The ACLU also alleged that the procedure of incarcerating indigents 
under pay or serve warrants was fiscally unsound as the system had in-
creased the costs of incarceration, and fines were never collected.386  For 
example, the investigation found that in one jail during a five-month period, 
the loss to the municipality was $110,000 as about 150 people served about 
1000 days in jail resulting in a cost of over $70,000 for incarceration and 
the cancelation of $40,000 in fees.387  The ACLU letters demanded that the 
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municipalities cease their unconstitutional practice of incarcerating individ-
uals for failure to pay fines without determining their ability to pay.388 
Following the ACLU investigation, Colorado enacted legislation 
designed to reduce the incidence of debtors’ prisons.  The ACLU 
proclaimed the legislation to be “the first of its kind across the country and 
will serve as a model for other states.”389  Specifically, Colorado amended 
its statute dealing with the due process requirements for monetary pay-
ments.390  Unlike the Ohio Supreme Court’s distinction between fines and 
fees, the amended Colorado statute replaces “fine” with the broader term 
“monetary amount” to reflect that the amendments apply to all court-
imposed monetary amounts.391  The amendment further requires that if a 
court imposes a monetary amount on a defendant, that the court instruct the 
defendant that if she is unable to pay the amount due at any time, she must 
contact the court or the court’s designated official to explain the inability to 
pay.392  Recognizing the impact of monetary sanctions on the poor and their 
families, the statute sets forth procedural protections that, among other 
things, prohibit incarceration “when a defendant is unable to pay a 
monetary amount due without undue hardship to himself or herself or his or 
her dependents.”393  A court may not revoke probation, find a defendant in 
contempt of court, or incarcerate a defendant for failure to pay: 
unless the court has made findings on the record, after providing 
notice to the defendant and a hearing, that the defendant has the 
ability to comply with the court’s order to pay a monetary amount 
due without undue hardship to the defendant or the defendant’s 
dependents and that the defendant has not made a good faith 
effort to comply with the order.394 
                                                          
 388.  Letter from Rebecca T. Wallace & Mark Silverstein to Herb Atchison, supra note 388, at 
5–6; Letter from Rebecca T. Wallace & Mark Silverstein to Joyce Downing, supra note 385, at 5–
6; Letter from Rebecca T. Wallace & Mark Silverstein to Joyce Jay, supra note 385, at 6–7.  
 389.  End Debtors’ Prisons, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF COLO., http://aclu-
co.org/campaigns/end-debtors-prisons/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).  Additionally, the provision 
made the list of ten ways that Colorado made history in 2014.  Nathan Woodliff-Stanley, From 
Pot to Protests: 10 Ways Colorado Made History in 2014, HUFF POST (Mar. 2, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-woodliffstanley-/from-pot-to-protests-10-
w_b_6402052.html. 
 390.  Act of May 9, 2014, ch. 164, 2014 Colo. ALS 164, (codifies as amended at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1.3-702 (2015)). 
 391.  Id. (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-702(a) (2013)); Recent Legislation, supra note 
363, at 1315–16 (classifying the change as “a subtle but important fix that captures court costs and 
fees in addition to fines”). 
 392.  Act of May 9, 2014, ch. 164, 2014 Colo. ALS 164, (codifies as amended at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1.3-702 (2015) (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-702(2)(a) (2013))). 
 393.  Id. (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-702(3)(a) (2013)). 
 394.  Id. (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-702(3)(c) (2013)). 
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Moreover, the amendment eliminates pay or serve warrants, by providing 
that courts may only issue warrants for failure to appear.395  A criticism of 
the Colorado approach is that it fails to define “undue hardship.”396 
B.  Hybrid Approach 
Instead of trying to completely overhaul the system by eliminating 
monetary sanctions or setting fines as a percentage of income, a more 
practical and less extreme approach—given budgetary issues and the 
information currently available to courts—would be to eliminate the most 
egregious sanctions, provide flexibility to rely on earning levels in setting 
sanctions, and establish procedures to ensure that courts enforce the 
restrictions that the Supreme Court established in Bearden.397 
As described in Part II, Bearden requires that a court assess an indi-
vidual’s ability to pay and alternative measures of punishment before re-
voking probation and incarcerating a defendant for failure to pay a fine or 
restitution.398  Although the Bearden Court set forth these restrictions more 
than thirty years ago, courts have not adhered to its mandate.399  To comply 
with Bearden, states should follow the lead of Ohio and Colorado in estab-
lishing practical methods for reducing the incidence of debtors’ prisons.  
Both plans recognize the due process and equal protection considerations 
developed in Bearden that people should not be incarcerated simply be-
cause they are unable to pay criminal justice debt.  This Section proposes a 
system that uses the Ohio and Colorado plans as models to establish a 
practical method of enforcing the requirements of Bearden but also 
incorporates the abolition of certain charges and sets certain fines based on 
income levels. 
1.  Determine the True Nature of Charges and Whether Charges 
Should be Assessed 
The first step in deciding whether incarceration should be permitted 
for the failure to pay a monetary charge is to assess the primary purpose for 
the charge.  In practice, the terms “fines,” “fees,” “costs,” and “restitution,” 
are often used interchangeably.400  Legislatures and courts should evaluate 
                                                          
 395.  See id. (striking provision in COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-702(2) (2013) stating “If the 
defendant fails to pay a fine as directed, the court may issue a warrant for his or her arrest . . . .”).  
 396.  Recent Legislation, supra note 363, at 1316–17. 
 397.  Ruback, supra note 82, at 574 (“That state courts do not follow the law does not neces-
sarily mean that all economic sanctions should be abolished.  Rather, actions should be taken to 
make the courts follow the law.”). 
 398.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667–72 (1983); see supra Part II B. 
 399.  See supra Parts II.B.1 & III.B. 
 400.  See Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1203–08 (discussing how the categorization of 
criminal justice debt impacts its treatment). 
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monetary charges based on their primary penological rationale and recog-
nize that other reasons for charges may exist.  The label “fine” should be 
reserved for charges that have a primarily punitive or deterrent purpose, 
while “restitution” should be for charges primarily designed to compensate 
victims, and “fees” should refer to charges and costs that are primarily 
designed to reimburse expenses. 
Analyzing the true nature of a charge would provide courts and legisla-
tures the opportunity to determine if the charge is one that should be 
imposed.401  For example, a case could be made that courts should not re-
quire application fees or reimbursement charges for public defenders.402  
Such charges disproportionately affect indigent clients and may leave them 
without representation if they cannot afford to pay.  The process could also 
be used to help determine whether to eliminate or reduce charges that are 
merely used to collect revenue for non-criminal justice matters.403  For ex-
ample, the Ferguson report stressed the problems that occur when munici-
palities improperly use the criminal justice system for revenue collection 
rather than public safety.404 
The process should also examine situations where imposition of fees is 
fiscally counterproductive.405  For example, a study in Rhode Island from 
2005 to 2007 found that “15% of the incarcerations [for court debt] cost the 
state more than the amount owed by the individuals.”406  Reforms following 
impact analysis studies of LFOs in Rhode Island led to reductions in incar-
ceration costs to the state and an increase in criminal justice debt collect-
                                                          
 401.  An additional consideration that is beyond the scope of the article is whether a fine vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment’s restriction on “excessive fines.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  For 
recent discussions regarding renewed calls for the use of the Eighth Amendment to justify re-
strictions on criminal justice sanctions, see Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 
102 CAL. L. REV. 277 (2014); EISEN, supra note 39, at 6–7; Eisen, supra note 104; Development 
in the Law Policing, supra note 307, at 1742–45. 
 402.  Beckett & Harris, supra note 12, at 526–27.  A detailed discussion of whether fees and 
charges should be assessed for public defenders is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a discus-
sion addressing the application fee issue, see Wright & Logan, supra note 109.  For calls to end 
the use of public defender charges, see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 11. 
 403.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1206–07 (discussing cases, including cases involving 
charges for a law library, overhead, and overtime payments where “courts have invalidated vari-
ous costs and fees when the connection between the assessment and its particular use [was] too 
attenuated.”); Ruback, supra note 82, at 576 (suggesting elimination of fees especially those at the 
county level designed for revenue generation). 
 404.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 2. 
 405.  See, e.g., PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 240, at 11 (suggesting that jurisdictions perform an 
“impact analysis of proposed and existing fees” to determine “whether a policy is fiscally sound, 
or merely a hypothetical revenue source that will actually cost more to implement than it generates 
in revenue”).  For more details about the fiscally counterproductive nature of incarcerating indi-
gents, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 406.  RHODE ISLAND FAMILY LIFE CTR., COURT DEBT & RELATED INCARCERATION IN 
RHODE ISLAND 4 (2007), 
http://www.realcostofprisons.org/materials/Court_Debt_and_Related_Incarceration_RI.pdf. 
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ed.407  The reforms in Rhode Island included allowing judges to establish 
payment plans and waive fees and fines for those unable to pay.408  Addi-
tionally, to prevent unnecessary jail time, judges are required to promptly 
hear cases involving individuals arrested for failure to appear at payment 
hearings.409 
Additionally, courts and legislators could look at standardizing charges 
to combat allegations about discriminatory treatment in the system.410  Such 
an approach could help alleviate concerns that the judicial system is more 
interested in revenue collection than the administration of justice. 
One approach to evaluating fines and fees would be to use independent 
commissions.  Professors Wayne Logan and Ronald Wright advocate the 
use of such commissions “to assess, monitor, and control the ever-
expanding, pell-mell collection of LFOs.”411  Under their proposal, “[t]he 
commission should comprehensively review existing LFOs, approve newly 
proposed LFOs, and collect and publish data relevant to their legal and pol-
icy desirability.”412  Independent commissions with a broad range of inter-
ested parties could further reduce conflicts of interest and concerns over ex-
cessive reliance on revenue generation.413  Additionally, independent 
commissions could create much needed transparency by evaluation and 
publication of their findings on existing and proposed fines and fees.414  
This would allow for comparison of fines and fees among municipalities 
and provide for more effective public scrutiny of local practices.415 
2.  Prohibit Incarceration for Failure to Pay Reimbursement 
Charges 
Having established the true nature of a charge, courts should not be 
permitted to use the threat of imprisonment as a method of collecting funds 
that will merely reimburse costs or expenses of those involved in the 
criminal justice system.  In such circumstances, the beneficiaries of the 
                                                          
 407.  See, e.g., PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 240, at 13 (reporting a reduction of “$190,000 in 
marginal costs” and an annual increase of over $160,000 in funds collected). 
 408.  Id. 
 409.  Id.  
 410.  See, e.g., CARL REYNOLDS ET AL., TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, A 
FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE HOW FINES, FEES, RESTITUTION, AND CHILD SUPPORT ARE ASSESSED 
AND COLLECTED FROM PEOPLE CONVICTED OF CRIMES 27–30 (2009), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2009-CSG-TXOCA-report.pdf (describ-
ing a plan designed to “[c]larify and consolidate the sprawling variety of state and local fees and 
costs into a comprehensible package”); see also Burch, supra note 345, at 542 (discussing the 
Texas proposal).  
 411.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1178.  
 412.  Id. at 1215. 
 413.  Id. at 1215–26. 
 414.  Id. at 1221–26. 
 415.  Id. at 1222. 
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payments should be limited to the same remedies available to creditors and 
collectors of civil debts.  For example, when a defendant uses a public de-
fender and then fails to pay the fees, the state can threaten incarceration for 
failure to pay.  But when a defendant hires a private attorney and then fails 
to pay his attorney’s fees, the attorney would not be able to employ the 
same coercive collection techniques.  The state should be limited to the 
same remedies as the private attorney.416  The Ohio Plan recognizes this dif-
ference by stating that while non-payment of fines may result in incarcera-
tion, non-payment of fees and costs are civil obligations subject only to civ-
il remedies.417 
3.  Establish Guidelines and Procedures for Determination of 
Indigency for Failure to Pay Fines or Restitution 
Under the hybrid approach to reforming modern-day debtors’ prisons, 
individuals should not be imprisoned for the failure to pay fines or 
restitution if the failure to pay is due to their inability to pay.  As part of the 
process for making the ability-to-pay determination, courts should only 
allow incarceration after the court has given the defendant notice and had a 
hearing where specific findings of ability to pay are made on the record.418  
Moreover, defendants should be notified of their right to counsel and be 
provided a court-appointed attorney if they are unable to afford one.419  The 
ability-to-pay determination should, as outlined under the Colorado plan, 
take into account the potential undue hardship not only to the defendant but 
also to the defendant’s dependents.420 
                                                          
 416.  Paul M. Stein, Note, Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at 
the Law and the Constitution, 22 VAND. L. REV. 611, 631 (1969).  
 417.  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 373. 
 418.  As discussed, the Ohio plan requires notice of a hearing and specific findings before in-
carcerating an individual for failure to pay.  See infra notes 376 to 378 and accompanying text. 
 419.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 11 (recommending the use of court-
appointed counsel for criminal justice debt hearings); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & 
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons: The Ways Court-Imposed Debts Pun-
ish People for Being Poor 20 (2014), https://aclu-
wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Modern%20Day%20Debtor’s%20Prison%20Final%20(3).p
df (advocating “assistance of counsel [for individuals] whenever appearing in court or signing an 
order to be entered with the court for LFO collections”).  As a part of a settlement agreement in a 
federal action, the City of Montgomery, Alabama established procedures for enforcing the indi-
gency hearing requirements of Bearden in its municipal courts.  These procedures include the ap-
pointment of a public defender in all indigency hearing matters.  Montgomery Settlement, supra 
note 214, ¶ 5. 
 420.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-702(3)(a) (2015).  Texas criminal procedure requires that a 
court consider “the defendant’s employment status, earning ability, and financial resources; and 
any other special circumstances that may affect the defendant’s ability to pay, including child sup-
port obligations and . . . any financial responsibilities owed by the defendant to dependents or res-
titution payments owed by the defendant to a victim” in assessing whether misdemeanants should 
be required to reimburse a county for jail time.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.038(d) 
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To help streamline and standardize the process, specific guidelines and 
forms should be developed to allow courts to address the inability-to-pay 
issue properly.421  Although this may seem like a heavy burden, courts rou-
tinely make assessments about an individual’s need for a public defender.422  
A similar process should be developed for determining ability to pay.  For 
example, a settlement by the City of Montgomery, Alabama requires that 
for the next three years its municipal courts will have indigency hearings in 
failure to pay matters and establishes procedures for the hearings.423  At 
these hearings, courts will rely on the federal poverty level in determining 
indigency and will be able to inquire about information listed in defendants’ 
affidavits of substantial hardship.424 
In cases where courts find inability to pay, courts should be authorized 
to use alternative methods, including a reduction in the amount of the 
monetary sanction.425  Allowing courts to reduce fees and fines in cases of 
indigency has the appeal of the day-fine system in making the penalties 
proportionate to the defendant’s earning level.  Unlike switching to a day-
fine system, this process would not require a complete overhaul of the sys-
tem used to impose monetary sanctions.  Instead, it would be limited to cas-
es of indigency and would be just one of the alternative methods available 
                                                          
(West 2006).  A 2010 study suggests that Texas extend this requirement to other fee considera-
tions and that other states adopt this requirement.  BANNON ET AL., supra note 37, at 29. 
 421.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 12, at 11; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., supra note 419, at 19 (advocating the use of “clear statewide 
criteria for determining a person’s ability to pay LFOs”). 
 422.  See, e.g., WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEFENSE, DETERMINING AND VERIFYING 
INDIGENCY FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE 13−19 (2014), http://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0185-
2014_Determining_Indigency.pdf (discussing the process for determining indigency for the pur-
poses of obtaining a public defender in Washington state).  The topic of determining eligibility for 
counsel for indigent defendants is beyond the scope of this Article.  For more detailed infor-
mation, see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(g) (3d ed. 2014) (discussing indigency standards); Wade R. Ha-
beeb, Annotation, Determination of Indigency of Accused Entitling Him to Appointment of Coun-
sel, 51 A.L.R.3d 1108, 1108−24 (1973). 
 423.  Montgomery Settlement, supra note 214, at app. 1. 
 424.  Id.  But see John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use 
the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of Their Sixth Amendment Right to Coun-
sel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1215−18 (2013) (advocating the use of the Center for Wom-
en’s Welfare’s Self-Sufficiency Standards rather than the Federal Poverty Guidelines for deter-
mining eligibility for a public defender). 
 425.  The Supreme Court in Bearden identified that courts could consider “the propriety of 
reducing the fine” as an alternative to incarceration.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 
(1983). 
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to the court.426  Other alternatives to incarceration include payment plans 
and community service.427 
4.  Provide Notice, Training, and a Forum for Lodging Complaints 
Merely setting up a comprehensive system is not sufficient unless par-
ties are aware of the available protections and safeguards.  As in Ohio, 
bench cards should be distributed to courts explaining the proper proce-
dures to follow.428  The Ohio Plan also provides training for judges and 
court personnel.429  Training should be made available for all parties in-
volved in assessing and collecting charges including judges, court staff, 
probation officers, collectors, prosecutors, police officers, public defenders, 
and defendants.  While municipalities might balk at the expenses involved 
with training, they should be reminded that incarceration of those unable to 
pay is often more costly than the amounts recovered.430  Moreover, the im-
proper incarceration of indigents for failure to pay may subject municipali-
ties to costly lawsuits and federal investigations.431 
Pro-bono clinics, legal-aid services, and law students all offer the po-
tential for helping to educate indigent defendants about their rights.432  
Clear notices of procedures and rights should be provided to all defendants, 
posted in courtrooms, and provided on all citations.433 
                                                          
 426.  Bearden requires courts to consider the availability of “adequate alternative methods of 
punishing the defendant” before revoking probation.  Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668–69. 
 427.  See, e.g., Montgomery Settlement, supra note 214, at app. 1 (listing payment plans and 
community service as alternatives to incarceration for those who the courts finds do not have the 
ability to pay). 
 428.  For a discussion of the Ohio bench card, see supra notes 373 to 380 and accompanying 
text. 
 429.  Ohio Bans Debtors’ Prisons, supra note 372, at 61; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, supra note 12, at 11 (suggesting training for judges and court officials).  Similarly, the 
Montgomery settlement also requires the training of public defenders, and prosecutors.  See 
Montgomery Settlement, supra note 214, ¶¶ 5–6. 
 430.  See PATEL & PHILIP, supra note 240, at 14 (“Timely ability-to-pay determinations also 
save states money, allowing states to avoid needless costs incurred in futile collection attempts.”). 
For a discussion of how incarcerating individuals for failure to pay is fiscally counterproductive, 
see infra note 405 to 406 and accompanying text. 
 431.  See, e.g., Ferguson Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1; Jennings Complaint, supra note 
227, ¶ 1; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 90; Shapiro, supra note 12. 
 432.  See, e.g., Thomas F. Geraghty, The Criminal/Juvenile Clinic as a Public Interest Law 
Office: Defense Clinics; The Best Way to Teach Justice, 75 MISS. L.J. 699 (2006); Steven Zeid-
man, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of Student Defenders on the Rights of the 
Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853 (1996).  
 433.  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, supra note 364 (suggesting making available 
printed and online information regarding rights of defendants); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., supra note 419 (suggesting that courts “develop educational 
materials to make sure that individuals understand that ability to pay is a crucial issue, are in-
formed about mechanisms for seeking relief, and are aware of their right to counsel”); BETTER 
TOGETHER, MISSOURI COUNCIL FOR A BETTER ECONOMY, PUBLIC SAFETY-MUNICIPAL COURTS, 
15 (2014), http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/BT-Municipal-Courts-
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A system should be established for allowing defendants to report abus-
es in the collection of criminal justice debt.  Defendants should have a fo-
rum to file complaints.434  Consumers who have complaints against civil 
debt collectors have the ability to file complaints with the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).435  The system allows consumers to sub-
mit complaints of abuses by debt collectors via the internet, mail, telephone, 
or fax.436  The CFPB then, in turn, submits the complaints to the collectors 
to help resolve disputes.437  A similar system should be adopted to deal with 
complaints in the collection of criminal justice debt. 
5.  Establish Effective Enforcement Mechanisms 
Given the track record of courts’ non-compliance with the require-
ments of Bearden, reporting regarding use of ability-to-pay hearings, moni-
toring such hearings, and sanctioning violations are necessary.438  Judicial 
oversight could be conducted through existing state judicial review and 
conduct processes.  Additionally, the independent commission approach 
suggested by Professors Logan and Wright could also create a system for 
monitoring and tracking the use and enforcement of LFOs.439  Recording 
court hearings would assist in monitoring courtroom procedures and inves-
tigating courtroom complaints.440 
To evaluate the outsourcing of services to private parties, oversight 
and reporting are essential.  As a condition to performing services for mu-
nicipalities, private parties should be required to report to municipalities the 
amounts collected from defendants and how such amounts were allocated 
(for example, amounts allocated to fees or fines).441  Such information 
should be available for public review. 
                                                          
Report-Full-Report1.pdf (suggesting that “a basic list of rights, procedures, and consequences 
should be listed on the back of every municipal citation issued” and that the list should be “promi-
nently displayed at the entrance of every court session”).  
 434.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 8 (suggesting “a mandate to receive and in-
vestigate confidential complaints of abusive behavior involving private probation firms from pro-
bationers and other members of the public”). 
 435.  See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2015). 
 436.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB 
ANNUAL REP. 11 (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_March_FDCPA_Report1.pdf. 
 437. Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 435. 
 438.  See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., supra note 419 
at 20 (advocating “expand[ing] reporting requirements to account for the cost of collection 
LFOs”).  
 439.  Logan & Wright, supra note 24, at 1226. 
 440.  See Montgomery Settlement, supra note 214, ¶ 1 (requiring recording of court proceed-
ings as part of the City of Montgomery, Alabama’s settlement agreement). 
 441.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 30, at 8–10 (recommending the publication of pri-
vate probation company collection information and use of oversight mechanisms including inspec-
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If violations of procedures are found or reported, they should be quick-
ly investigated, especially given the potential for loss of liberty in these cas-
es.  To the extent violations are proven, sanctions should be issued and 
published so that the public is made aware of the parties involved.  For ex-
ample, judges could be disciplined for violations,442 and contracts with third 
parties could provide penalties for violations and non-compliance, including 
loss of future services from the jurisdiction.443  Publication of sanctions and 
penalties imposed on actors involved in abuses (including judges and pri-
vate probation parties) should also act as a deterrent to future violations and 
should create more accountability for public and private parties.444  Addi-
tionally, making the public aware of the efforts at reform should help quell 
some of the public distrust issues by allowing the public to understand that 
the system is addressing the abuses and that relief for abuses is available. 
Finally, we need to continually monitor and study our efforts and 
mechanisms.  Given the recent Ohio and Colorado plans, we should accu-
mulate data to assess whether these systems are working.  Initial reports 
from the Ohio System have been favorable, as an Ohio ACLU lawyer has 
stated “abuses have largely been stamped out.”445  On the other hand, the 
ACLU of Colorado has recently alleged that since January 2014, Colorado 
Springs has violated Colorado’s new legislation by using “pay or serve” 
sentences to incarcerate hundreds of indigent individuals to pay off their 
fines at a rate of $50 per day.446  In three-quarters of these cases, individuals 
were incarcerated for offenses that were only punishable by fines.447 
                                                          
tions of private probation companies).  Georgia has enacted legislation that became effective July 
1, 2015 establishing oversight and requiring transparency and financial reporting requirements for 
private probation companies.  H.B. 310, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).  For a de-
scription of the legislation, see 2015 Session of the General Assembly, ACCG LEGISLATIVE 
UPDATE, May 2015, at 6, 
http://www.accg.org/library/external/2015_5_15_Legislative%20Update%20FINAL%20EV.pdf.  
 442.  See, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Goldie, 119 Ohio St. 3d 428, 2008-Ohio-4606, 894 
N.E.2d 1226, at ¶¶ 17–18 (reprimanding a judge who failed to follow the state’s requirements for 
determining ability to pay before incarcerating a defendant for failure to pay a fine).  But see Jer-
emy Pelzer, Punishment Is Rare for Judges Who Illegally Jail Poor Ohioans for Court Debts, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/08/punishment_is_rare_for_judges.html (discuss-
ing difficulties in disciplining judges). 
 443.  See, e.g., Montgomery Settlement, supra note 214, ¶ 8 (establishing a three-year ban on 
contracts with private probation companies). 
 444.  For example, in cases of elected judges, receiving a public reprimand could result in not 
being re-elected.  See Pelzer, supra note 442 (reporting ACLU of Ohio’s Mike Brickner’s com-
ments regarding how disciplining judges could lead to negative publicity, which could result in 
voters electing a different judge). 
 445.  Ohio Bans Debtors’ Prisons, supra note 372, at 61. 
 446.  Letter from Nancy Woodliff-Stanley & Mark Silverstein, ACLU of Colo. to Wynetta 
Massey, Colorado Springs City Attorney 1–3 (Oct. 22, 2015), http://static.aclu-co.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/2015-10-22-Massey-Silverstein-Wallace-pay-or-serve.pdf; Press Re-
lease, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo., Colorado Springs Sentences Hundreds of Impoverished 
People to Debtors’ Prison in Violation of U.S Constitution and State Law (Oct. 22, 2015), 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the popular notion that modern society has abolished debtors’ 
prisons, Americans continue to be incarcerated simply because they are un-
able to pay their debts.  The same concerns that prompted calls to end debt-
ors’ prisons in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have returned as in-
digent defendants are unable to pay criminal justice debts.  The monetary 
charges imposed upon defendants are often unrelated to the alleged crimes 
and unfairly discriminate against the poor and minorities.  The need for rev-
enue generation is often in conflict with the goals of the criminal justice 
process.  As a result, the assessment, imposition, and collection of criminal 
justice debt have created distrust in the system, and indigent defendants and 
their families have become trapped in what seems like an endless poverty 
cycle.  It is time to restore that trust by adopting measures to end debtors’ 
prisons.  Moreover, once they are abolished, we need to remain vigilant to 
ensure that debtors’ prisons never return. 
                                                          
http://aclu-co.org/colorado-springs-sentences-hundreds-of-impoverished-people-to-debtors-
prison-in-violation-of-u-s-constitution-and-state-law/. 
 447.  Letter from Nancy Woodliff-Stanley & Mark Silverstein, ACLU of Colo. to Wynetta 
Massey, Colorado Springs City Attorney, supra note 446, at 2 (including over 200 cases involving 
soliciting for charity near streets or highways and over sixty-five cases involving being in city 
parks after closing time). 
